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Abstract 
 
We test whether immigrants are more prone to support terror than natives because of lower 
opportunity costs, using the international World Values Survey data. We show that, in general, 
economically, politically and socially non-integrated persons are more likely to accept using 
violence for achieving political goals, consistent with the economic model of crime. We also find 
evidence for the destructive effects of a ‘clash of cultures’: Immigrants in OECD countries who 
originate from more culturally distanced countries in Africa and Asia appear more likely to view 
using violence for political goals as justified. Most importantly, we find no evidence that the clash-
of-cultures effect is driven by Islam religion, which appears irrelevant to terror support.  
 
As robustness test we relate individual attitude to real-life behavior: using country panels of 
transnational terrorist attacks in OECD countries, we show that the population attitudes towards 
violence and terror determine the occurrence of terror incidents, as does the share of immigrants in 
the population. A further analysis shows a positive association of immigrants from Africa and Asia 
with transnational terror, while the majority religion Islam of the sending country does not appear 
to play a role. Again, we find that culture defined by geographic proximity dominates culture 
defined by religion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Terrorist groups rely on networks of local supporters for the planning and carrying-out of their 
terror attacks – a strong local support lowers terrorists’ direct and opportunity costs of carrying out 
their plans.1 Thus, an increase in such local support should trigger more terror attacks. Supporting 
terrorists, however, is an illegal activity, usually generating a non-monetary benefit – both 
Schnellenbach (2006) and Bernholz (2004) provide economic rationales why persons with certain 
preferences may choose to support terror groups rather than getting actively engaged in terror 
activities themselves; both Schnellenbach (2006) and Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue that 
supporters of terror groups behave more as ‘rational’ actors in the traditional sense than their 
leaders do, implying that economic incentives have a stronger impact on the first group than on the 
latter. The economics of terrorism literature, which can be applied in analogy to the decision to 
engage in support for terror, suggests that the rational choice to provide support depends also on 
the opportunity costs of doing so – such as forgone legal employment and political participation 
(e.g. Lichbach, 1987, Sandler and Enders 2004).2 Compared to natives, immigrants often face 
discrimination in the labor market and lack the political rights to influence policy outcomes, 
lowering their opportunity costs of engaging in terrorism-related activities. Consequently, we 
conclude from economic calculus that immigrants may be more likely than natives to support 
terrorist groups. 3  
 
This international study provides an empirical test of whether immigrants are more likely than 
natives to be supporters of terrorist groups; as main novelty, we discuss whether immigrant’s 
cultural background matters, differentiating between religion and geographic origin.4 We exploit 
                                                 
1
 The ultimate goals of terrorists are of a political nature. Intermediate goals include media attention, and the 
destabilization of polity and economy in the target country (e.g. Dreher and Fischer 2010, Frey and Lüchinger 2003, 
2004).  
2
 Earliest treatments of terrorists as rational decision-makers include Landes (1978) for hijacker’s choice and Sandler, 
Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983) for modeling negotiations between terrorists and democratic governments in target 
countries.  
3
 Support may be both direct and indirect: Indirect through e.g. providing terrorists with otherwise foregone income, or 
direct through e.g. giving them with mental support and helping them hide. Often, such support is provided within a 
framework of small religious or political groups (e.g. the Hamburg group of which two members attacked the Twin 
Towers in New York) – which is one of the reasons why particularly minority denominations or extreme political 
ideologies are more likely to be under suspect of supporting, or committing, terror.  
4
 MacCulloch and Pezzini (2010) provide an analysis of the determinants of individual support for a radical, 
revolutionary societal change versus a simple political reform, using the same survey as in this paper. However, not 
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the third wave of the World Values Survey (1994-1999) on 55’000 persons in more than 45 
countries, which includes a question on whether the respondent views using violence for achieving 
political goals as justified, which we view as appropriate approximation. This paper presents 
strong evidence for OECD countries that immigrants particularly from ‘Africa’ and ‘Asia’ are 
more prone than natives to accept violence as political means, consistent with the clash-of-cultures 
hypothesis based on Huntington (1996). Contradicting common-view expectations, religious 
denominations, such as being a Muslim, do not appear to matter. On the other hand, the ‘clash’ 
appears diminished for persons who are better integrated through a longer residence. Country 
panel analyses of the macro-determinants of transnational terror incidences in OECD countries are 
corroborative: they reveal a terror-increasing influence of immigrants from Africa and parts of 
Asia, which, however, is not triggered by the majority religion of immigrants’ countries of origin.   
 
Section 2 introduces the economic calculus that explains why immigrants may choose to support 
violence and terror, section 3 presents the testable main hypothesis, while section 4 describes the 
data and the methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the individual-level analysis 
for the effects of integration into society (of immigrants, but also in general) on the propensity of 
viewing violence as justified political means, also differentiating between the effects of regional 
culture and  religion. As robustness analysis, section 6 tests the relation between these self-report 
attitudes with real-life behavior. Finally, section 7 brings the individual-level analysis of section 5 
to the country level: for a panel of OECD countries we analyze whether immigration triggers 
transnational terror, and whether immigrants’ culture defined by geographic region of origin or 
religion plays a relevant role for this association. Section 8 concludes and discusses the potential 
for future research.  
 
 
2. Integration of immigrants and the propensity to support terror and violence 
 
Integration of immigrants into their host society can take place in various realms – with respect to 
labor market, political participation, but also values and attitudes (‘culture’). Better integration 
                                                                                                                                                                
only is this attitude much less likely to measure support for terror, but also does their study not take account for 
immigration status and single religions.  
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increases individual’s choice set and raises the number of economic and political opportunities that 
aid improve on her socio-economic condition. Thus, integrating immigrants increases their 
opportunity costs of illegal activities, which, according to the economic model of crime (Becker 
1968), should decrease their propensity compared to that of natives to support (illegal) terror 
activities.5   
 
The importance of political opportunity costs for explaining the occurrence of terror attacks is 
stressed by Frey and Lüchinger (2004), Li (2005), and Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006). These 
authors suggest that preferences in the population that are not responded by government 
institutions cause grievance and discontent. Such non-response lets people seek alternative, illegal 
ways of expressing their preferences and pushing their needs, e.g. by engaging in terrorist 
activities, or, as Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue, by supporting terror groups. Compared to 
natives, immigrants often lack political rights and participation possibilities in politics, lowering 
their political opportunity costs and making them more likely to support terror.  
 
Economic opportunity costs are equally important for individual’s decision to support terror (e.g. 
Frey and Lüchinger 2003), which are equally determined by her degree of integration into the 
society. Similarly, Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue that ‘terrorism serves terrorists’: by 
damaging the target country’s economy they ease the recruitment of new supporters. Immigrants 
may, at first, face unemployment and discrimination in the labor market, decreasing their 
economic opportunity costs of illegal activities compared to natives’. Thus, insufficient economic 
integration may increase immigrants’ propensity to support terror groups. However, as residence in 
their host countries continues, they may become economically better integrated, increasing their 
opportunity costs of supporting terrorists up to native’s level.  
 
Finally, the psychological costs of committing a crime may play a decisive role – one possible 
economic interpretation of the ‘clash-of-civilizations’-hypothesis by Huntington (1996). He 
suggests that violence and terror between members of two groups emerges because of the tensions 
                                                 
5
 For a theoretical economic model according to which through raising opportunity costs extreme nihilists cannot be 
prevented from committing acts of terror, see Schnellenbach (2006). Nevertheless, moderate nihilists may well 
respond to changing incentives. Bernholz (2004) provides as alternative explanation for why terrorists may possibly 
not respond to economic, political or social incentives lexicographic preferences (‘supreme values’). 
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generated in case both groups are shaped by two greatly differing cultures - they ‘clash’.6 
Economically speaking, antagonistic group identities and value systems lower the psychological 
costs of using violence against members of the other group.7 According to his theory, such ‘clash 
of cultures’ may aid terror groups to recruit members and, as we argue, supporters. This 
development is aggravated when one group (or both) is(are) universalistic and missionary in their 
ideals, claiming cultural or morale superiority, as in the case of (religious or political) 
fundamentalists who intend to build a new ‘better’ world order. Thus, we expect such 
psychological costs to be decreasing in the cultural distance and dissimilarity between the two 
groups, for example in the distance between immigrants’ values and traditions to that of natives’ 
culture. Differentiating by world regions and religion, Huntington (1996) predicted a general rise 
in conflicts between Western countries and ‘the rest’, with highest conflict intensities between the 
‘West’, on the one hand, and ‘Islam’ and ‘Sinic’ cultures, on the other (, p.245).  
 
Most economic country-level studies of terror have focused on testing predictions from the 
traditional economics of terrorism-literature, which relates institutional, economic and societal 
states to terrorists’ costs and benefits of committing terror attacks, and thus to the occurrence of 
terror events as the outcome of their rational choice. For example, in support of the political 
opportunity costs argument Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) have shown that well-working political 
institutions and decentralized governance structures reduce terror (see also Li 2005, Piazza 2006, 
Dreher and Fischer 2010). The empirical evidence for the effects of economic opportunity costs is 
scant and inconsistent (Piazza 2006), possibly because aggregate GDP and income inequality 
reflect individual economic circumstances only imperfectly. We are also not aware of any 
convincing empirical test of the Huntington-hypothesis. Neumayer and Plümper (2009), one of the 
few studies that find a significant impact of ‘Islam’, use a world panel on transnational terror 
events 1969 - 2005, to test dyads of ‘Islam terrorists’, ‘Non-Islam terrorists’ and ‘Western 
victims’. They find that both the dyads ‘Islam’-‘West’ and ‘rest of the world’-‘West’ trigger more 
attacks. Failing to differentiate by culture among the group ‘rest of the world’, their finding is best 
interpreted as an indication that ‘Western’ persons are more likely to be victimized by terrorists 
                                                 
6
 According to Huntington (1996), other forms of ‘clashes’ include economic wars and military interventions. He 
thinks of terrorism as form of conflict to which the ‘West’ is particularly vulnerable.  
7
 Even if those groups were similar in their view on the use of violence, it is the dissimilarity in their values and 
attitudes in general that drives down the psychological costs of acting with violence against non-members.  
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than ‘non-Western’ people. That the religion of the attacker may be an important determinant of 
terrorist activity has already been suggested by Krueger and Malečková (2003): they show in a 
world panel of transnational terror attacks 1997-2002, arranged by perpetrator’s country of origin, 
that terrorists originating from Muslim, but also from Christian and Hindi countries are more 
‘active’ compared to those with no religion: they commit significantly more terror attacks.8 
However, both studies lack to directly test a ‘clash-of-cultures’ as they fail to differentiate out the 
diverse cultures of the perpetrators and to match them with differing cultures of their target 
countries – for example, Krueger and Malečková (2003) implicitly assume that a Muslim potential 
terrorist behaves in an identical way in all parts of the world likewise. Furthermore, they fail to 
discuss which dimension of culture dominates – culture defined by geographic proximity or based 
on religion. In sum, all these aggregate-level analyses suggest that both receiving and sending 
countries’ culture, political institutions and economy play a role for the emergence of terror. 
However, no study so far has investigated into one of the underlying mechanism at the individual 
level, namely people’s grievance, opportunity costs and their resulting support for terror. We ask in 
this study to what extent political, economic or cultural integration into society impacts this 
attitude, and whether support for terror transmits into the space of actual terror events.  
 
 
 
3. Main hypothesis 
 
This paper argues that, compared to natives, immigrants are more likely to support terror. This 
likelihood of showing such attitude is the higher, the less successful their economical, political, 
and cultural integration into their host society is.     
 
Hypothesis: The propensity of immigrants to support terror is higher than for natives. This 
propensity decreases in the integration into their host society. 
 
                                                 
8
 For more studies in political science and sociology that fail in finding ‚clashes-of-cultures’, particularly ‚Islam’, see 
also Neumayer and Plümper (2009). 
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As discussed in the theory section (section 2), the relation between economic, political, and social 
integration and terror-support is of a generic nature - thus, it may hold for any member of society, 
be it an immigrant or a native. For example, the experience of involuntary unemployment as form 
of labor market disintegration should increase the propensity of any member to support violence 
and terror, compared to an employed. Thus, in this paper we start by testing a generalized version 
of the hypothesis above, treating ‘immigrant’ as a special case in the course of this analysis:  
 
Hypothesis (generalized): The propensity to support terror is higher for societally less integrated 
persons than for the better integrated ones. This propensity decreases in the degree of integration 
into society. 
 
 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1. Dependent variable: terror and violence propensity 
Enders and Sandler (2002) define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-
normal violence or brutality” for achieving political objectives; such definition implies that 
viewing exerting violence for achieving political purposes as justified may be a prerequisite and 
first step to become an active supporter of terrorist groups. We thus approximate the propensity to 
support terror with a measure of the propensity to use violence for political goals, obtained from 
the 3rd wave of the Word Values Survey 1994-1999 (WVS) that provides information on attitudes 
and values of about 55’000 persons in more than 45 countries (see Table A1 of the Appendix for a 
list of included countries). For each country, a representative sample of the population of about 
1000-1500 persons is collected. The following question serves as our dependent variable: “Here is 
one statement. How strongly do you agree or disagree with it?, ‘Using violence to pursue political 
goals is never justified.’ ” The possible four answers range from ‘strongly agree’ (1), ‘agree’ (2), to 
‘disagree’ (3), and ‘strongly disagree’ (4). Thus, higher values indicate a higher propensity to 
support terror.9  
 
                                                 
9
 The remaining waves of the WVS did not include this question in their surveys. 
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Aggregated to the population level as percentage shares of people responding either (3) or (4), we 
view this attitude as an approximation of a terror-sympathizing environment. As we argue in 
section 2, such terror-sympathizing environment may aid terrorists in carrying out their attacks or 
provide them with a pool of potential recruits – decreasing their costs of committing an attack 
(Schnellenbach 2006, Bernholz 2004). Thus, as rational terrorists weigh the expected costs against 
the expected benefits of an additional attack (Dreher and Fischer 2010), ceteris paribus, the 
optimal number of attacks should increase in people’s support for terror. To support this 
conjecture, the second part of this paper provides separate tests which link the level of violence-
acceptance in society with the occurrence of actual terror attacks.   
 
However, the validity of this attitude measure may be put into question. For example, one may 
claim that the vague broadness of ‘violence’ and the imprecision with respect to ‘political goals’ 
make question “do you agree to using violence for achieving political goals” a kitchen-sink 
attitude measure with little information on their opinion on the actions of private persons (in 
contrast to that of governments) against the government or other private persons. However, we 
believe that the embedding of this question into a section that exclusively asks about people’s 
vertical relation with their governing authorities frames respondents’ associations and 
interpretations: The WVS contains a section on ‘Politics and Society’, located between the section 
‘Work’, ‘Family’, and ‘Religion and Morale’. The ‘Politics and Society’ section includes questions 
that deal with peoples’ attitudes and relations to their governments and politicians. For example, 
this section asks about policy goals the government should pursue (e.g. ‘more emphasis on family 
life’), people’s confidence in government institutions (parliament, police, justice system), their 
voting behavior, their past political actions (strikes, signing petitions, etc.). In the third wave, this 
section also includes our measure of attitude towards accepting violence. This framing on vertical 
citizen-government relations restricts ‘violence’ to violence exerted by residents only, and rather 
excludes violence exerted by governments, such as activities of war. Similarly, respondents may 
associate ‘political goals’ with goals pursued by citizens and residents - their own political goals or 
those of their peers. Thus, even though this ‘acceptance-of-violence-for-political-goals-question’ 
may be, when viewed in isolation, open to many interpretations, its embedding into the actual 
survey as one last item in the ‘Politics and Society’-section clearly restricts its application to a 
ruled-ruler relation - with violence exerted by citizens against other citizens or the government as 
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such. However, to support our interpretation and validity of this variable, in the second part of this 
paper we present analogous results for a much smaller sample that uses a direct measure of 
support-for-terrorism. In addition, we relate this support-for-terror attitude to individual self-report 
behavior of having committed violence against persons for achieving political goals. 
 
 
4.2. Focal variable: Generalized integration measures 
For measuring integration in the social, political and economic dimensions we use the following 
variables from the WVS. First, to account for social integration we use dichotomous indices of 
self-assessed geographical identification with (alternatively) one’s local commune, region, 
country, continent, or the world, or ‘having no identity’, based on the WVS question “to which of 
these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?”. We also employ a dichotomous 
index of social network based on the question “how important are friends in your life”: persons 
replying ‘very important’ and ‘rather important’ are believed to enjoy the benefits from integration 
into society through personal private relations. Second, political integration is approximated by 
individual self-positioning on a 10-point scale: persons with extreme leftist or conservative 
opinions are more likely to find their preferences not represented by the parties in the political 
system. Both social and political integration may also take place through engagement in groups 
and organizations that pursue certain political goals (e.g. environmental groups, churches, parties). 
Based on eight questions on active or passive engagement in such groups, we employ a 
dichotomous index of ‘active involvement’ that accounts for this integration aspect.10 Finally, 
economic integration is accounted for by labor market integration. We use the occupational status 
variable of the WVS that provides information whether the respondent is full-time employed, half-
time employed, a student, a houseman/housewife, unemployed, retired or ‘other’. Among these, 
the involuntarily disintegrated (and thus with the largest grievance) is the group of unemployed, 
while both housewives and retired are probably rather voluntarily out of the labor market and thus 
to a lesser extent susceptible for terror support.11  
 
 
                                                 
10
 This definition excludes ‘passive’ members who only pay membership fees.  
11
 The distinction between voluntary and involuntary disintegration can be made based on aspiration theory.  
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4.3. Measures of immigrants’ integration 
We also employ some measures of integration that are available for the group of immigrants only - 
in the full sample, there are about 3’500 immigrants. First, we extract the information ‘having been 
born in the country’ [of residence], which gives rise to a dichotomous measure of immigrant status. 
Thus, our measure ‘born in this country’ excludes all persons having been born abroad, 
irrespective of whether they have already gained citizenship in their host country or not (such 
information is not available in the WVS). Native persons can easily be believed to be better 
integrated in many dimensions than immigrants (social networks, culture, politics, and labor 
market). Second, we employ five dichotomous measures of duration of residence in the country, 
expecting that the extent of economic and social integration increases with it. Possibly, the 
likelihood of having gained citizenship equally increases in duration of residence. The underlying 
variable of residence period includes the six categories ‘ < 2 years’, ‘3-5 years’, ‘6-10 years’, ‘11-
15 years’, and ‘ > 15 years’. Furthermore, we use the information in the WVS on immigrant’s 
region of origin (‘Europe’, ‘USA/Canada’, ‘Asia’, ‘Africa’, ‘Oceania’, and ‘other’) – information 
on single sending countries is not available - to objectively measure their cultural distance to their 
host country, differentiating between ‘World’ and the subsample of ‘OECD’ host countries.12 In 
line with Huntington (1996), we expect the cultural distance and resulting conflict intensity 
between European and North-American sending countries to ‘OECD’ receiving countries to be the 
lowest.  
 
 
4.4. Control variables 
The third wave of the WVS also includes socio-economic information on both natives and 
immigrants. The vector of individual-level controls includes gender, age, education, marital status, 
and number of children. Since a better education generates a higher income, and may cause 
information advantages in general, higher education may lead to a better economic and social 
integration into society. With respect to marital status, one may argue that singles are not as much 
integrated as married persons, particularly in more conservative and traditional societies. Some 
empirical models control also for individual religion (Catholic, Protestant, Christian-Orthodox, 
                                                 
12
 Regions of origin are employed as coded in the original data. The grouping into ‘OECD countries’ is roughly 
equivalent to various definition of ‘Western’ countries in studies of sociology and political science.   
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Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, other), which reduces the regression sample by about 20%.13 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables are described in Table A2 of the 
Appendix. 
 
Table 1a describes for the world sample the distribution of violence-propensity across immigrants, 
defined as foreign-country born persons, and natives. This prima facie-look reveals no difference 
in attitudes between both population groups – an interpretation which is statistically supported: in 
both groups, about 20% find that using violence for political goals is justified. For the sample of 
OECD countries (Table 1b), immigrants show a higher propensity to support terror than natives 
(18% versus 15.30%, difference significant at the 5 percent level).14 There is a clear need to 
differentiate immigrants by the degree of their integration in the political, economic and social 
dimension and to use a multivariate approach.    
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
4.5. Empirical models 
Using the cross-sectional WVS data, we estimate the following linear relation for the general 
effects of integration into society on terror support: 
 
acceptanceis= f(integrationis, Xis, FEs), 
 
where acceptanceis denotes the acceptance of individual i in country s to use violence to pursue 
political goals, integrationis the measure of i’s integration into country s, Xis a vector of individual 
socio-demographic controls described above, and FEs a set of country–specific fixed effects that 
account for differences across countries with respect to the macroeconomy and majority culture 
(e.g. Fischer 2010).  
                                                 
13
 Religious denomination and income are not included in the baseline models due to the large number of missing 
observations. 
14
 Test statistics based on a two-sided T-test on the equality of means across two samples, assuming unequal variances.   
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To analyze integration effects for immigrants, the models employ interaction terms between 
measures of integration and ‘immigrant status’: 
 
acceptanceis= f(integrationis, integrationis* immigrantis, Xis, FEs), 
 
These empirical models of terror support are estimated with OLS, which preserves direction of 
influence and relative quantitative effects of the determinants even when the dependent variable is 
ordinal (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Using OLS has the advantage over estimating 
ordered probit that coefficients are easily interpretable as marginal effects and that interaction 
terms allow direct calculation of total marginal effects. Standard errors are corrected for 
heterogeneity and intragroup correlation through clustering at the country level.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Integration into society and violence propensity 
As first step, Table 2 provides a general test how integration into society (of immigrants and 
natives likewise) affects their propensity to support terror. Model 1 tests the baseline specification 
that also includes measures of political and economic integration, while models 2, 3, and 4 add 
additional integration measures. Model 1 focuses on the baseline effects of employment status and 
political ideology, model 2 adds measures of geographical group identification, while models 3 
and 4 estimate the additional effects of active membership and of having friends, respectively. 
Models 5 to 8 repeat this exercise for a subsample of OECD countries. For interpreting 
coefficients, note that positive values indicate a higher propensity to support terror (‘does not 
accept that using violence is not justified’ = violence is justified). 
 
All models in the world sample in Table 2 show that those with extremist leftist or conservative 
political views are more likely to accept using violence to achieve political goals, compared to 
persons with a centrist view. These effects disappear in the subsample of OECD countries which 
suggests that persons with an extremist political view are well integrated in the existing political 
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system; their political preferences appear reflected in their country’s party system. In contrast, both 
in the world and OECD sample interviewees without a political self-positioning appear to reject 
supporting terror, possibly reflecting a general disinterest in politics. For OECD countries, 
moderate-leftists equally appear to disagree with using violence for political goals.  
 
As regards economic integration, reflected by labor market integration, we find for both the world 
and OECD countries that housewives and unemployed – persons with little labor market 
integration and, hence, low economic opportunity costs of criminal activity – tend to support terror 
compared to the full-time employed (reference group); for institutionally well-developed OECD 
countries, the same is observable for self-employed. Possibly, in OECD countries self-employed 
are disadvantaged (and economically ‘discriminated’) insofar as they are either excluded from 
certain welfare benefits and schemes, or that they have to contribute much more in order to obtain 
the same benefit as a dependently employed or a civil servant.15  
 
Model 2, which tests geographic identity effects, shows that having a national identity reduces 
support for terror, while having no geographical identity increases it, compared to when having a 
‘world identity’. Obviously, feeling geographically ‘homeless’, namely not feeling integrated into 
any country (creating a ‘no identity’), decreases the psychological costs of terror-support (that may 
harm persons in the country one lives in). In contrast, the analysis for OECD countries (model 6) 
reveals only a statistically weak ‘no geographic identity’-effect.  
 
Having a social network does decrease one’s propensity to accept using violence, as models 3 and 
4 (7 and 8 for OECD countries) show. In the world sample, only having friends appears to make 
respondents prefer peaceful ways of achieving political goals, while organizational networks play 
no role. In contrast, in OECD countries, the stronger propensity-lowering effect is exerted by 
people’s active engagement in organizations and parties, while friends appear to matter little. This 
finding is in line with Li (2005), as in institutionally well-developed and democratic countries 
political grievances are less likely for persons actively involved in the political decision-making 
process compared to those with no political engagement.    
                                                 
15
 The results of the baseline models 1 and 5 are robust to the inclusion of further repressors in the remaining models 
of Table 2. 
 14 
 
The results for the remaining control variables (see Table A3) show that, as expected, male 
respondents are more likely to accept violence as political means. The likelihood increases in age 
for adults but decreases for older adults again. Terror support declines with education, but is higher 
for the separated (compared to the married), while it appears to be uncorrelated with the number of 
children.  
 
Taken together, consistent with the economic theory of crime (Becker 1968), Table 2 suggests that 
political, social and economic disintegration increases the propensity to support terror, both around 
the world and in OECD countries. Consistent with Li (2005), Table 2 also suggests that well-
working democratic institutions and multi-party systems in OECD countries help to avoid 
grievances of political extremists or the actively engaged. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5.2. Integration of immigrants:  residence, employment and political ideology 
As second step, we test our main hypothesis whether immigrants show a stronger propensity to 
support terror or not; furthermore, we also analyze the effects of integration into society for this 
group, expecting that disintegration effects are larger for immigrants than for the native population. 
We test this conjecture by adding an interaction terms between ‘immigrant status’ and the various 
integration measures employed in the full population in Table 2. An insignificant interaction term 
coefficient would then indicate that the disintegration effects for the support of terrorism are 
identical for immigrants and natives likewise. We test this conjecture of differential effects by 
immigration status for both the world sample (Table 3) and for OECD countries (Table 4); both 
tables test immigrant status as such (model 1), duration of residence (model 2), and the presence of 
immigrant-specific effects for political ideology (model 4), employment status (model 5), and 
having friends (model 3). Section 5.3. is then devoted to the role of political and social engagement 
separately, while section 5.4. analyzes differential impacts of geographic origin and geographic 
identity.  
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Models 1 and 2 add to the empirical baseline model immigrant status and the duration of residence, 
which is available for immigrants only. In OECD countries, the negative coefficient on ‘born in 
this country’ indicates that immigrants have a higher propensity to support for terror (at the 5 
percent level of significance) – a result that is not evident in the world sample. However, with 
those staying less than two years in their host country as reference group, we find no statistical 
evidence that duration of residence matters, both in the world and the OECD samples.16  
 
The remaining models show that most effects of societal disintegration are of similar magnitude 
for immigrants and natives likewise - only a few interaction terms turn out significant: For 
example, having friends and political ideology appears to influence the propensity to support terror 
of both immigrants and natives the same way (models 3 and 4).17 Equally, the propensity-
increasing effect of unemployment and self-employment are not heterogeneous between the two 
groups.18 In contrast, in both OECD countries and the world sample, native housewives are more 
likely to support terror than housewives of immigrants (OECD: 0.278-0.163 versus -0.163). 
Immigrant housewives appear even explicitly to reject using terror, particularly in OECD countries 
(-0.163).  
 
Overall, Tables 3 and 4 corroborate our main hypothesis for the sample of OECD countries: 
immigrants do show a higher propensity for terror-support. However, we find in many cases that 
social and economic disintegration in other dimensions does not appear to exert heterogeneous 
effects between immigrants and natives. We do not, however, completely reject as explanation for 
the insignificant interaction terms that the major distinction might have to be made not between 
immigrants and natives as such, but between native and long-term residence immigrants, on the 
one hand, and short-duration residing immigrants, on the other, which we test in section 5.6.  
 
                                                 
16
 The series of coefficients (0.044, -0.011, -.0.59, -0.048) may suggest that longer residence, does, possibly, have a 
positive integrating effect. Further research is needed.   
17
 In model 4 of Table 3, the interaction term on ‘leftist-extreme ideology’ and ‘born in this country’ is almost 
significant at the 1ß percent level. This finding suggests that the propensity of extreme leftists to accept violence is 
larger among immigrants than among natives (0.171 versus 0.171-0.092). 
18
 The coefficient on the interaction terms for ‘unemployed*born’ rather indicates that unemployed natives experience 
stronger grievances than unemployed immigrants; the opposite is observable for the self-employed. Again, further 
research is needed.  
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--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
5.3. Integration of immigrants: Social and political engagement 
Table 2 has already indicated that for OECD countries active membership in clubs and 
organizations lowers the propensity to accept using violence for political goals, possibly because 
such engagement can be used for expressing political preferences and influence policy-making (Li, 
2005). That social capital and (formal and informal) networks play an important role in the 
functioning of a democratic and civil society has been postulated by Putnam (1993) for Italian 
local communes, and empirically shown by Guiso et al. (2008). Table 5 tests whether active 
membership (and the number thereof) reduces the propensity to support terror for immigrants and 
natives likewise. Models 1 through 5 are for the full world sample, while those from 6 to 10 are 
estimated for the subsample of OECD countries.   
 
Making a binary distinction of those with an active membership from those without any does not 
yield statistically convincing results: membership in social networks does not exert any effect on 
the probability to support terror, be it by immigrants or natives (models 1 and 6). Employing a 
continuous measure of the number of active memberships, ranging from 0 to a maximum of 9, 
yields for OECD countries a support-decreasing effect (until membership number 4), at a 
decreasing rate (models 7 and 8). The irrelevance observed in the world sample (models 2 and 3) 
may well reflect again, consistent with Li (2005), the institutional underdevelopment in most of 
these countries. This social network effect is, however, strongly heterogeneous across the two 
population groups ‘natives’ and ‘immigrants’, as indicated by the significant interaction terms: 
assuming linearity in the number of active memberships, model 4 reveals for the world sample a 
‘zero’-effect for natives (e.g. 0.030 + -0.025 = 0.005), but a strong propensity-increasing one for 
immigrants; for OECD countries, we observe qualitatively the same (model 9).  
 
More informative and, possibly convincing, findings are obtained when assuming non-linearity in 
the number of memberships (models 5 and 10), giving a better fit to the underlying data: For 
 17 
immigrants in the world (model 5), the propensity effect is zero for low numbers of active 
memberships, while the very active ones appear to turn their social and political engagement into 
support for terror – a finding consistent with so-called theories of political radicalization (e.g. 
McCauley and Moskalenko 2008); for natives around the world, political engagement is not 
related to terror support. For OECD countries (model 10), the picture is somewhat different: for 
both natives and immigrants, the support for terror declines in the number of active memberships. 
For immigrants, we observe a propensity-lowering effect (-0.064*num. + 0.021*num.^2), at a 
decreasing rate. For the natives, the propensity-lowering effect is less steep, and occurs rather at a 
constant rate (-0.064+0.038 = -0.026* num.; 0.021-0.017 = 0.004 * num.^2).  
 
Overall, Table 5 shows for OECD countries that active engagement in social networks and 
political organizations decreases people’s support for violence. In the rest of the world, active 
engagement in possibly ‘toothless’ organizations does not appear to really matter, either to natives 
or to immigrants. This finding is consistent with the political opportunity costs argument 
developed by Li (2005). In OECD countries, the propensity-lowering effect is larger for 
immigrants than for natives. Obviously, integration in terms of social and political engagement 
does reduce the need for immigrants and natives to choose supporting terror for expressing their 
social and political preferences. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
5.4. Integration of Immigrants: Geographic identity and the ‘clash of cultures’  
Integration of immigrants occurs not only regarding the labor market and the social and political 
dimensions, but also with respect to the cultural sphere. This section investigates two aspects of 
cultural integration of immigrants: first, Table 6 tests whether having a certain geographic identity 
exerts differential effects on terror support by immigration status. Second, it analyzes whether the 
world region of origin (which is only available for immigrants) impacts the propensity to accept 
violence. We proceed then with an analysis for a subsample of OECD countries, attempting to find 
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evidence for the so-called ‘clash-of-cultures’ between the ‘Western world’ and other regions 
(Huntington, 1996): We measure individual immigrants’ cultural distance to Western OECD 
countries by adding to the model dichotomous measures of their geographic region of origin, as 
provided and coded in the WVS (‘Asia’, ‘Africa’, etc.).19 By using this measure of immigrants’ 
geographic origin we implicitly assume that neighboring countries share similar cultures (e.g. 
Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt).  While Huntington (1996) predicted ‘clashes’ between various 
cultural regions, this empirical set-up restricts the analysis to those affecting the ‘Western’ regions. 
Table 6 presents the results. 
 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 clearly show that having no geographical identity increases the 
propensity to support terror in OECD countries – but for the natives only (e.g. 0.350 - 0.117). 
Immigrants with no geographical identity rather tend to reject the use of violence (-0.117, 
coefficient insignificant). Compared to Table 2, differentiating between immigrants and natives 
lets the importance of having a national identity disappear.  
 
Model 3 reveals a strong culture-of-origin-effects in the world sample: people who emigrated from 
the USA or Canada into the remaining, mostly ‘non-Western’ world are less likely than natives to 
accept violence as political means, as the negative coefficient indicates (at the 5 percent level) - 
possibly an effect of having been raised in countries with strong ‘Western-style democracies’ that 
teach to, in respect for other’s life and health, seek peaceful ways of influencing policy outcomes. 
We also find weak propensity-increasing effects for emigrants from Africa and Asia - an effect 
driven by those emigrating into culturally distanced OECD countries (see model 4). These findings 
are largely robust to controlling for individual denomination. 
  
As second step, model 4 tests the ‘clash-of-cultures’ hypothesis by analyzing whether there exist 
region-of-origin effects in the subsample of OECD host countries.20 We chose the subsample of 
OECD countries because they share certain common characteristics, which lets them appear as 
culturally quite homogenous (while the rest of the world in model 3 is rather diverse in culture): 
compared to the ‘rest of the world’, OECD countries are more likely to have stable democracies 
                                                 
19
 This approach is identical to adding dyads of immigrant origin and ’Western country’ to the world sample.   
20
 The OECD countries in the regression sample include Australia, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, and the USA. 
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and well-working government institutions, be open economies shaped by well-functioning labor 
markets institutions, and share ‘democratic’ values in general. They all belong, in the terminology 
of Huntington (1996), to the ‘Western’ culture. Based on his intensity-of-conflict predictions (, 
p.245), we expect the cultural distance experienced by people emigrating from other ‘Western’ 
OECD countries to be zero, but the culture gap for those from the African (‘Islam’) and Asian 
(‘Sinic’) regions to be the largest. Again, we predict terror support to increase in cultural distance. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Model 4 of Table 6 is consistent with the Huntington-hypothesis insofar that great differences 
between immigrants’ individual cultures and that of their OECD host countries increases 
immigrants’ support for terror. On the one hand, we observe that immigrants from the 
USA/Canada and Europe are not different in accepting using violence for political goals compared 
to natives – this is an indication that value systems of people from Northern America and Europe 
are comparable to those of natives in the remaining OECD countries, thus, they experience no 
cultural ‘clash’, which produces no conflict. Interestingly, now we find a strong propensity-
lowering effect for immigrants from Latin America – a result of a Catholic tradition to obey god-
given government authorities? A result equally consistent with Huntington (1996), who predicted a 
low conflict intensity between people from the ‘Latin’ regions and the ‘Western’ region. On the 
other hand, model 4 indicates large cultural distances for immigrants originating from countries in 
Africa, Asia or Oceania, with the latter also including the regions Polynesia and Micronesia.21 The 
positive coefficients indicate that in OECD host countries their propensity to accept violence is 
larger than that of the natives – clash-of-culture effects for regions predicted to generate high 
conflict intensity. All cultural origin-influences are robust to controlling for individual 
denomination - some are even increased in statistical significance (see Table 7). The fact that these 
cultural effects persist when individual religion is controlled for supports the view of a ‘clash-of-
                                                 
21
 Note that the finding for ‚Oceania’ is reverted when actual share of immigrants are related to actual number of 
transnational terror incidences (see Table 14) – possibly an effect of the heterogeneous composition of this region, that 
also includes Australia and New Zealand.  
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cultures’ effect that is distinct from a ‘clash-of-religions’ effect. Overall, the findings of model 4 
are consistent with the Huntington-hypothesis of a clash-of-cultures.  
 
 
 
5.5. The role of religion 
One may argue that ‘culture’ is not only geographically defined (as implicitly assumed in section 
5.4.), but also through values and attitudes that are transmitted through individual’s religion. 
Indeed, much public discussion on the effects of failed integration of immigrants is along the line 
of religion rather than geographic origin – Huntington (1996) is a good example for grouping 
countries into a culture he calls ‘Islam’ and developing religion-based arguments for a high 
conflict intensity between ‘Islam’ and the ‘Western’ world. Possibly, some religions may rank 
peacefulness above every other goal, while others may justify the use of violence under certain 
circumstances (e.g. for self-defense, for fighting ‘holy’ wars, for missions, etc.). According to 
Huntington (1996), we should expect religions that are universalistic and missionary in their ideals 
to raise people’s support for terror in general, but even more in Western OECD countries. In this 
section we test whether the propensity to support terror is influenced by religious values, 
approximated by self-reported religious affiliation, both worldwide and for Western OECD 
countries only. OECD countries are not only similar in their ‘Western’ values and attitudes (as 
discussed in section 5.4.), but also with respect to their majority religion, which are almost all 
‘Western-type’-Christian (Catholic or Protestant). In the light of section 5.4., the analysis for 
OECD countries will aid us judging whether the ‘clash-of-geographic-cultures’-effect of Table 6 
persists in the presence of controls for religion – or whether it simply approximates a ‘clash-of-
religions’. Put simply, this last analysis provides an answer to the question whether e.g. Serbian 
immigrants in OECD countries differ in their behavior from natives because they follow a certain 
religion (Christian-Orthodox or Muslim) that differs from the majority religion of their host 
countries or because they come from a geographic region with a differing culture (Balkan region). 
The results are presented in Table 7.   
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 add religious denominations to the baseline model of Table 2, which 
excludes measures of immigrant’s geographic origin. Column 1 estimates this new model for a 
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world sample, while column 2 carries out the identical analysis for the subsample of OECD host 
countries. According to the estimates in both columns, most religious denominations (Catholic, 
Christian-Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, and the reference category Protestant) play no role for the 
propensity to support violence for political goals, both across the world and in OECD countries.22 
We should emphasize that, contrasting common expectations, being ‘Muslim’ exerts no significant 
impact in the world sample (column 1); in contrast, in OECD countries Muslims show a larger 
propensity to support terror compared to the (native and immigrant) Protestants, our reference 
category. This positive Muslim-effect is consistent with the Huntington’s conflict-intensity-
predictions between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. It is also congruent with experiences of the general 
public in many OECD countries with already very young Muslim immigrants and second-
generation pupils being among those with the highest number of self-report committed violent 
crimes (for Germany, see Baier et al. 2009, Baier and Pfeiffer 2007).23 The weakly significant 
positive effect for ‘Hindu ’ in the OECD sample is equally consistent with the original Huntington-
hypothesis, while the insignificance of Christian-Orthodox is not. Overall, models 1 and 2 Table 7 
show that most denominations play only a negligible role for explaining the propensity to support 
violence for political goals. However, not controlling for geographic origin, Muslims in OECD 
countries show a significantly larger support for terror.24 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Model 3 of Table 7 adds controls for immigrants’ region of origins, that lets us test the ‘clash of 
cultures’ versus the ‘clash of religions’-hypothesis. To emphasize the most important finding 
(given the ongoing public discussions), we find no evidence any more that Muslims have a higher 
                                                 
22
 The positive significant coefficient on ‘other’ is not easily interpretable given its rather kitchen-sink nature, pooling 
minor religious denominations and having no denomination.  
23
 In their 2007 survey, p.26,  they report shares of pupils who have admitted to have committed at least one 
infringement of German criminal law that involves an act of violence (e.g. assault, robbery); pupils with a Turkish and 
Southeast-European cultural background show a prevalence rate  that is double in size than that of their German 
contemporaries.   
24
 The low number of observations for certain religious denominations across immigrants makes a separate analysis of 
religion effects by duration of residence or region-of-origin unreliable.  
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propensity to support terror than Protestants. The estimates also reveal that the propensity-
increasing effect of being a Hindu is now dominated by the region-of-origin effect. On the 
contrary, column 3 shows that the clash-of-cultures effect defined by regions (see section 5.4.) 
persists when individual denomination is accounted for. These findings are robust to excluding 
Turkey from the sample (not reported). Overall, model 3 suggests that culture defined by 
geographic region dominates culture defined by religion.  
 
Taken altogether, we find that the clash-of-cultures is not triggered by a clash-of-religions: 
religious denomination does not matter to individual support for terror. We rather observe that 
people with differing religions but originating from the same geographic region share common 
values and attitudes.25 
 
 
5.6. Does integration of immigrants prevent the clash of cultures? 
Section 5.4. has shown that culture as defined by geographic origin plays an important role for 
immigrants’ support for terror, which, as section 5.5. suggests, persists when differing religion-
based value systems are accounted for in the empirical model. To policy-makers, an important 
question is whether a better integration of immigrants mitigates the clash-of-culture-impact on the 
host society. We test this conjecture by adding interaction terms between the region-of-origin 
effects and integration measures in the sample of OECD countries. Table 8 tests integration of 
immigrants into the labor market (model 1), with respect to social engagement (model 4) and the 
duration of residence (models 2 and 3). We have chosen such measures of integration that leave a 
sufficiently large number of observations in the comparison groups; in general, immigrants who 
have recently moved to their host countries (<5 years) or who are unemployed appear rather 
underrepresented; about 50% of the immigrants in the sample stayed 15 years and longer in their 
host countries. In principle, given the low number of immigrants from certain geographic regions 
the findings have to be viewed rather as first attempt than a final analysis.   
 
                                                 
25
 Table 7 assumes religion to be homogeneous across natives and immigrants, e.g., that Catholics from Latin America 
are comparable in their values and attitudes to Catholics residing in OECD countries. Differentiating by religion of 
foreign-born and immigrant population preserves the Muslim-no-effect for immigrating Muslims.  
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Table 8 presents the results of this analysis – with the strongest ‘clash-of-cultures’-reducing effects 
for a long duration of residence, and some for integration in the labor market. Column 1 uses 
‘employment, full-time or part-time’ as measure of labor market integration, column 2 and 3 
measures of residence duration, and column 4 the number of active social engagements. Column 1 
shows that for people from Oceania employment does reduce the clash-of-cultures effect - the 
clash-of-culture effect is propensity increasing for the unemployed in this group (1.195), but 
roughly zero for the employed ‘Oceanians’ (1.195 – 0.936), compared to natives. For immigrants 
from the USA and Canada we observe the opposite, namely that the non-employed strictly reject to 
use violence (-0.448), while the employed are roughly similar in their attitude to natives (0.672 - 
0.448). Employment does not appear to lead to cultural integration of those belonging to the group 
of ‘others’. For the remaining groups of immigrants from Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America, 
employment equally does not appear to influence the impact of region of origin, as the 
insignificant interaction terms indicate. However, the now-observable insignificant effect of 
certain regions of origins (when compared to section 5.4.) suggests that also for people from Africa 
and Asia employment has an important effect on their terror propensity. In sum, with natives as the 
reference group, employment in the host country appears to let immigrants’ attitudes adapt toward 
that of the natives, in case their attitudes were different as non-employed.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Integration of immigrants measured by duration of residence does appear to mitigate the clash of 
cultures: with at least 15 years of residence, all cultural groups experience a propensity-lowering 
effect (column 2), as indicated by the negative interaction terms (significant at the 5 or 1 percent 
levels, respectively).26 In contrast, no integration effects are observable for a residence duration 
exceeding 6 years (column 3). The long-term-residence effect of 15 years even overcompensates 
any support-increasing region-of-origin impact (the non-interacted values in the first half of Table 
8): immigrants who reside for a very long time in their host countries come to reject violence for 
                                                 
26
 Roughly 50% of all immigrants in the OECD subsample stay longer than 15 years in their host country, also when 
split by region of origin, except for Oceania. 
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political goals even more strongly than the natives, the comparison group. Finally, we cannot 
observe that immigrants’ political and social activities in organizations and political groups lower 
the effects of a clash-of-cultures (column 4); rather, it appears that increased political engagement 
of immigrants from Latin America and Oceania go in hand with an increased acceptance to use 
violence for political goals – possibly an indication of immigrants developing extremist political 
views as their political engagement intensifies. 
 
In sum, while the previous analyses reveal that a ‘clash of cultures’ increases immigrants’ 
propensity to support terror in OECD countries, Table 8 suggest that a very long residence in the 
OECD host country mitigates and even overcompensates such effect.27 Similarly, we observe that 
a successful integration into the local labor market makes immigrants in their attitudes similar to 
natives.  
 
 
 
6. Attitude versus real-life behavior: linking micro surveys to macro phenomena 
 
6.1. Acceptance of violence for political goals = support for terrorism?  
Possibly, our previous analyses suffer from the shortcoming that they operationalize the support 
for terror by measuring the propensity to accept using violence for political purposes, assuming 
that the latter broader category constitutes a prerequisite for, or simply sufficiently encompasses, 
becoming a supporter of terrorist groups. However, as discussed in the data description section 
(section 4) ‘violence’ as well as ‘political goals’ are not defined in the survey and may not only 
cover illegal terrorist attacks, but also acts of wars that are legitimized by the UN security council. 
Thus, one may argue that our attitude measure used so far does not capture support for terror. 
 
We remedy this shortcoming by employing the variable ‘support for terrorism’. This measure of 
terror-support is extracted from the first wave of the WVS, the only wave that includes the 
question “Terrorism is everyday news. In Principle, most people are against it, but there is still 
                                                 
27
 Discussing causality, however, we cannot exclude as explanation the self-selection of the clash-of-culture-affected 
into further emigration from their former host countries or, possibly, the return to their home countries. We discuss the 
restrictions of this empirical study in the conclusion. 
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room for differences of opinion. Which of these statements do you tend to agree with ? (A) There 
may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified. (B) Terrorism for whatever motive must 
always be condemned” Possible answers are a) Agree with A b) agree with B and c) neither. We 
code this acceptance-of-terror question in analogy to the acceptance-of-violence, so that higher 
values indicate greater acceptance (-1 for answer b), 0 for answer c), and 1 for answer a)). There 
are, however, shortcomings when using the first wave of the WVS: its low number of observations 
(about 25’000 in 20 mainly OECD countries), its origination from the early eighties (1981-1984), 
and its missing information on immigration status and region of origin. The first wave also 
includes the religious denomination information and a vector of socio-demographic controls (age, 
gender, education, occupational status, marital status).28 Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table A4 of the Appendix. 
 
To test whether our measure of acceptance-of-violence-for-political-goals (wave 3) approximates 
support-for-terror (wave 1) we compare whether religious denomination, our focal determinant, 
behaves similarly for both measures. To ensure comparability, we construct dichotomous measures 
of terror support from both attitude variables; we also restrict all regressions to the subsample of 
OECD countries. Models 1 and 4 of Table 9 employ the full set of religious denominations, while 
the remaining models exclude those with an insufficient number of observations.  
 
Table 9 presents the marginal effects for the association of religious denomination with the 
acceptance of violence for political goals (models 1-3) and the acceptance of terrorism (models 4 
and 5), both estimated with probit with standard errors adjusted to clustering at the country level. 
All regressions show that religious denomination exerts a similar impact on either measure of 
terrorism-support. In OECD countries, excluding measures of regions of origin, both Muslims and 
Buddhists are more likely than Protestants (reference category) to accept violence for political 
goals and to support terrorism likewise. In contrast, believers of all other major denominations 
have a comparable attitude to that of Protestants. Exclusion of ‘Buddhists’ from the regression 
sample does not alter these findings. Note that all models do not include controls for regional 
origin which, as Table 7 indicates, we expect to dominate the religion effect:  
                                                 
28
 The first wave measures education in completed years as compared to highest degree obtained. In the regression 
sample of 13’000 surveyed persons, 44% are Protestants, 53% are Catholic, 0.19% are Hindu, 0.24% Jewish, 0.17% 
Muslims, and 1.92% of another, unknown denomination.  
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Also for the remaining explanatory variables do we observe similar effects across the two types of 
terror-support-measures (not reported): both attitudes are hyperbolic in age, strongly positive in 
being male, and rather accepted by extreme left-wingers. We do, however, observe some 
differences for extreme conservatives, housewives, and unemployed across the two samples. 
Differential effects for political ideology may result from the different types of terrorism in the 
early eighties compared to that of the late nineties. The non-support of the unemployed and 
housewives for terror in the eighties may be rooted in the rather rosy labor market condition during 
that time (with unemployed and housewives expecting fast re-integration) compared to that of the 
nineties (with high rates of long-term unemployed).29 
 
Overall, Table 9 suggests that propensity to accept violence for political goals and propensity to 
view terrorism justified are comparable measures of the latent construct ‘support for terror’, 
particularly with respect to the effects of religious denomination.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
6.2. Self-report support for terror and committing violent acts against persons 
A general shortcoming of attitude measures is that their relevance for actual behavior can always 
be put into question. Does people’s self-report propensity to accept violence constitute an attitude 
that approximates interviewee’s real-life behavior? Committing acts of terror involves damaging 
persons - conflicting with basic human rights. Doing so may trigger high psychological and 
economic opportunity costs, preventing many sympathizers to get actively involved – whereas 
reporting a supportive attitude in surveys comes at small costs for the interviewee. This lets our 
measure of reported terror-support appear a simple lip service with little real-life consequences. 
Why our data do not allow observing (self-report) active support of terror groups, we can validate 
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 We also observe a difference in the impact of having a high education (indifferent in wave 1 but strongly rejecting 
violence in wave 3), possibly caused by using dissimilar measures – years in wave 1 and degree in wave 3.  
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the attitude measure by relating it to a question on committing violent behavior against persons for 
political purposes.30  
 
To validate our attitude ‘support for terror’, we investigate a) whether there is association between 
this measure and self-report behavior ‘having done violent actions against persons for achieving 
political goals’. We also test b) whether religious affiliation affects actual behavior the same way it 
affects attitude. We measure actual behavior by a dichotomous measure that indicates whether in 
her past the interviewee has committed violent acts for political goals against persons, or not. This 
measure is based on the following question, from the first wave of the WVS: “Now I’d like you to 
look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political actions that people can 
take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done these things, 
whether you would do it, might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do any of them: 
“Using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police.”  Answers include 
‘have done [in the past]’ ‘might do [in the future]’ and ‘would never do’. Omitting those 400 of 
15’000 persons responding to the second category, we use the first answer for measuring ‘having a 
violent past’ versus ‘having no violent past and not sympathizing with use of violence in the near 
future’. Our analysis relates this actual behavior to the attitude of terror support, a dichotomous 
measure which omits the small number of undecided in the intermediate category, equally obtained 
from the first wave. Table A4 of the Appendix reports descriptive statistics of the variables in the 
first wave of the WVS. 
 
The simple Spearman rank correlation between the attitude ‘support for terror’ and the activity of 
‘violent acts’ against persons is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (0.06). Table 10 
regresses religious affiliation but also a dichotomous measure of terror support on the dichotomous 
index of violent past as political activity; reported are the marginal effects of the probit estimates 
for OECD countries, with standard errors adjusted to clustering at the country level. Models 1 - 3 
include controls only for gender and age, while models 4 - 6 include the full set of control 
                                                 
30
 In a sense, this section tests whether a pro-terror attitude makes one a potential recruit by terrorist groups, in line 
with radicalization theories (e.g. McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). However, as discussed in section 2, terrorists may 
well profit from a sympathizing attitude, which lowers their direct and opportunity costs of committing terror attacks. 
For example, sympathizers may contribute by giving small donations. The WVS lacks questions on actual supporting 
behavior. We test the relation between population attitude and terror incidences in section 6.3.   
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variables (education, marital status, occupational status). For reasons of comparison, significant 
control variables are also reported. 
 
Table 10 shows that persons who find terrorism justified are also likely to use violence against 
persons for political goals. In model 2 (5), changing from ‘non-support’ to ‘support’ is associated 
with an increase in the probability of actually committing violent acts against persons by 0.9 (0.6) 
percentage points. This attitude effect for actual behavior is substantial, and comparable in size to 
that of the socio-demographic determinants in the control vector: In model 5, the attitude effect is 
about as large as the positive gender effect, and the positive unemployment effect, and larger than 
the positive effect of ‘being single’ (0.003).  
 
Table 10 also shows that the effect of religious affiliation on actually committing violent acts is 
analogous to the effect for terrorism-support of Table 9. Being ‘Muslim’ in Western-culture OECD 
countries shows a significant positive association with committing violent acts against persons as 
political activity, while the remaining denominations have a propensity equally large compared to 
Protestants, the reference group.31 (Note that Table 10 does not include regional-culture measures 
which are not available in the first wave).  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, Table 10 provides empirical evidence for Western-culture OECD countries that people’s 
attitude towards terrorism at least partly reflects actual politically motivated violence against 
persons – many of those who report to be in support for terror have actually already made the next 
step of exerting politically motivated violence against persons themselves. Speaking with the 
model of Schnellenbach (2006), Table 10 separates moderate from extreme nihilists in the WVS 
micro survey. Most importantly, the attitude measure is validated not only as the self-report 
attitude is a decisive determinant of actual behavior, but also as religion does affect attitude and 
behavior in identical ways.  
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 The varying number of denominations is caused by perfect prediction in some models 2 and 3.  
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6.3. Acceptance of violence and occurrence of terror 
While these micro-level findings of the WVS suggest that there is a strong relation between 
individual attitude ‘support for terror’ and actual individual behavior, it is not clear whether such 
relation holds also at the aggregate level, relating attitudes in the population to real-life macro-
economic and social phenomena. As discussed in the theory section (section 2), the hypotheses 
developed by Li (2005) and Kurild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) suggest that people’s discontent with 
government policies should increase their propensity to support terror networks or, possibly as 
final step, even start actively engaging in terror activities themselves. Schnellenbach (2006) has 
argued that terrorist’s costs of committing terror acts decline as local support for her activities 
increases in the population. Thus, even if increased terror support in the population does not turn 
people into new terrorists at large, it makes the ‘terror-production-process’ by the already existing 
terrorists less costly. Thus, we expect the number of terror attacks to increase in people’s 
propensity to support terror.   
 
This section tests whether in target countries population attitude towards terror affects the 
occurrence of transnational terror events. Using the RAND-MIPT data set on terror incidences 
from 1970-2000, we extract the number of transnational terror attacks in target countries from 
1995-2000. We match these data with the target country’s population share supporting terror, 
observed between 1994 and 2000, constructed for each of the 45 countries in wave 3 of the WVS. 
These cross-sectional data on a maximum of 45 countries are then augmented with a vector of 
control variables (GDP, population, civil liberties, voting in line with the USA at the UN, 
economic growth), based on previous empirical research on the socio-economic causes of terror 
(e.g. Dreher and Fischer 2010, Dreher and Gassebner 2008, Piazza 2006).32 We employ three 
different measures of terror attacks: the number of transnational terror events in the current year 
(model 1), the average count of terror attacks between 1995 and 2000 (model 2), and averaged 
terror rates (defined analogously to crime rates) in the population (model 3); the models are 
estimated with the negative binomial estimator (model 1) or using OLS (models 2 and 3).33 Table 
A5 of the Appendix provides descriptive statistics. The share in the population that accepts using 
                                                 
32
 The low number of observations does not allow the inclusion of decentralization measures. Because of the low 
number of observations in the sample period, an analogous empirical analysis for domestic terror was not feasible.  
33
 Using averages of terror events smoothes out yearly fluctuations that might otherwise disguise systematic relations 
between the explanatory variables and the explanand. However, using the negative binomial estimator has the 
advantage of taking account of the count-structure of terror events and the overrepresentation of zero attacks. 
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violence for political goals ranges from about 1% up to 56% in the sample; the average number of 
events between 1995 and 2000 varies from 0 to about 80, with mean of 1. The results are presented 
in Table 11.  
 
Table 11 shows that the population support for terror affects the occurrence of transnational terror 
events: All models suggest that the number of terror events in a country increases in people’s 
propensity to accept the use of violence for political purposes. The significant coefficient on the 
squared term indicates an effect at a decreasing rate. The non-linearity implies that for some 
countries in the sample the association may even become negative (beyond the turning point of the 
population attitude-terror relation); possibly, a wide-spread attitude that supports terror leads to an 
underreporting of terror attacks.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Most control variables in Table 11 show the expected direction of influence (e.g. Piazza 2006): In 
tendency, terror events increase in population size and in economic growth, but are lowered if the 
country undertook a recent institutional change to become more democratic. No effects are 
observable for GDP per capita, the level of democracy and voting in line with the US. The few 
differences compared to the previous literature with respect to voting behavior in the UN can 
easily be explained by the much smaller number of countries, many of them OECD countries, and 
the missing time dimension in the sample.  
 
As robustness test, Table 12 presents the results when the ‘terrorism is justified’-question of the 
first wave of the WVS is employed in place of the terror-support-measure of wave 3. This gives 
rise to a cross-section of a maximum of 12 OECD countries. We construct the dependent variables 
of transnational terror events measures for the time period 1980 to 1985 in exact analogy to the 
previous analysis. We account for the very small sample size by reducing the number of control 
variables to a minimum, including only GDP, population size and political rights. Between 1980 
and 1985, the population share of those who view terrorism as justified under certain 
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circumstances varies from 12% to 29%, while the average terror count varies from 0.17 to 32. In 
Table 12, models 1 and 4 use the original count variable and estimate a negative binomial 
regression, while the remaining models that use averaged transnational terror counts or rates, 
respectively, are estimated with OLS.  
 
Table 12 clearly supports that the number of terror events increases in the share of the population 
viewing terrorism as justified political means. The significant coefficient on the squared term in 
models 1 and 2 indicate a decreasing marginal effect, mirroring the finding of Table 11. This non-
linearity is corroborated when in models 4 and 5 an outlying country is excluded and the attitude 
measure is employed in its log form. Note that the statistical insignificances in models 3 and 6 
pertain to all explanatory variables in the regression, not only the determinant of interest. The 
control variables show the expected influences: a positive effect of population, a decreasing effect 
of political rights, and an insignificant coefficient on national income.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 12 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, Tables 11 and 12 show that a favorable population attitudes towards using violence for 
political goals or even using terror under certain circumstances, our alternative measures of terror 
support, are positively related with actual terror incidences: Corroborating the individual-level 
findings of section 6.1.and 6.2., also the country-level do we find that attitude and outcome of 
behavior strongly correlate. These findings are consistent with economic models of terror and 
crime discussed in section 2 that view terrorists’ costs lowered as the level of local support for 
their activities increases.  
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6.4. Summary of robustness tests 
The empirical analyses in section 6 show convincingly that following relations hold:  
1. the individual attitudes ‘support for terrorism’ and ‘acceptance of using violence to achieve 
political goals’ are strongly related and overlapping concepts  
2. at the individual level, such attitude is a strong predictor of actual behavior (committing acts of 
violence against persons as political means) and  
3. at the country level, both attitudes as population characteristics are decisive determinants of the 
occurrence of transnational terror events, even when political and economic factors are controlled 
for.  
 
Overall, these robustness and validity tests suggest that the ‘clash-of-culture’ effect observed in 
section 5 does not only impact actual individual support for terror, but, through all transmission 
channels at the country-level, should also affect the occurrence of terror attacks. Since this ‘clash-
of-culture’ effect increases the individual propensity to support terror, we should, in turn, observe 
that the population attitude changes in the share of immigrants that originate from such culturally-
distanced countries. Consequently, we expect that the more immigrants from culturally-distanced 
regions with a strong conflict potential live in a certain country, the more terror attacks should 
occur in this country. The next section provides an empirical analysis of this conjecture for 
‘Western’ OECD countries.  
 
 
 
7. Outlook: Immigration and the occurrence of terror attacks in OECD countries 
 
For OECD countries our individual-level analyses of sections 5 and 6 suggest that immigrants are, 
in general, more likely to support terror  - a finding consistent with economic models of illegal 
activities (e.g. Becker 1986), as well as politico-economic models of terror choice (Li 2005), 
according to which immigrants who are socially, economically and politically less integrated than 
natives. For OECD countries, the micro-level analyses also indicate that immigrants from Africa 
and Asia have a higher propensity to support terror than the native population or immigrants from 
most of the other world regions, irrespective of their religious denomination. We interpret this 
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finding as being generally in line with the clash-of-civilizations-hypothesis (Huntington 1996), 
even though we reject his hypothesis of a ‘Muslim-culture’-clash with the Western world. 
Bringing these micro results to the aggregate level, in general, a rising share of immigrants should 
be positively associated with the occurrence of terrorism in OECD countries, as their favorable 
attitude and local support lowers terrorists’ cost of committing terror attacks. Furthermore, we 
expect immigrants from Africa and Asia to show a stronger influence on terror incidence than 
immigrants from other world regions, an impact that is independent from their religious values – a 
question we pursue as second step. This final section of the paper provides a tentative empirical 
answer to these questions, calling for more in-depth research in the future.  
 
 
7.1. Immigration and terror: a country panel analysis 
As first step we analyze the relation between immigration, viewing immigrants as one 
homogenous group, and the occurrence of terror in OECD countries. We combine a country panel 
of transnational terror events 1970-2004, obtained from the RAND-MIPT database (see Table 11),  
with annual data on the share of immigrants in the population (stock) in 26 OECD countries, 1992-
2006, retrieved from the CESifo DICE database. In the following, we estimate the following linear 
relation 
 
terrorit= f(immigrantsit-1, Xit-1, FEi, Tt), 
 
where the dependent variable, the number of transnational terror incidences in country i at time t 
(terrorit), is a function of the share of immigrants in the population (immigrantsit-1), a couple of 
control variables (Xit-1) that are obtained from the literature on transnational terrorism (Piazza 
2006, Dreher and Fischer 2010), country fixed effects (FEi), and a non-linear time trend that 
accounts for the time dimension (Tt ). The control variables are the same as in Tables 10 and 11.34 
Following the empirical literature, we lag all explanatory variables by one period. The country 
fixed effects account for time-invariant traits such as governance structure and national culture, 
and recording behavior. Given that we account for such unobserved heterogeneity across countries 
                                                 
34
 Given the sample of OECD countries, we exclude the variable ‘voting in line with the US in the UN’ commonly 
employed in world samples (e.g. Dreher and Fischer, 2010). 
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and that the set of explanatory variables is lagged by one period, we have some confidence in 
identifying a causal relationship between immigration and transnational terror incidences.35 
 
We follow the international definition of ‘immigrant’ as a person originally not born in her current 
country of residence.36 The definition in the CESifo DICE database includes all types of legal 
immigrants, irrespective through which program they entered the country – be it through a work 
permit, through family reunion programs, through a successful asylum application, or rescue 
programs for persons from regions of civil war, as in the case of Ex-Yugoslavia. In our panel of 26 
countries from 1993 to 2004 (189 observations), the maximum number of terror events is 13, while 
its mean is roughly 1 with a standard deviation of 1.9. The share of immigrants varies between 
1.9% and 33% in the resident population. Further descriptive statistics are presented in Table A6.37 
For all samples, Table 13 tests a linear and a non-linear relation between the (lagged) population 
share of immigrants and the occurrence of transnational terror events in 26 OECD countries. 
Having identified Spain as statistical outlier, columns 1 through 3 exclude Spain from the 
regression sample, while columns 4 through 6 present the full sample estimates. 
 
Overall, Table 13 clearly shows for all non-linear specifications that the share of immigrants is 
positively associated with the number of transnational terror incidents in OECD countries – which, 
given the econometric set-up, we interpret as causal relation. In the reduced sample that excludes 
Spain, models 1 and 2 show a positive impact of immigrant shares, but at a decreasing rate. This 
finding is corroborated in model 3 that employs the logarithmic transformation of our variable of 
interest. In the full sample, the evidence for the non-linear effect appears less strong, with an 
increase less steep and a curvature less pronounced (models 5 and 6). This positive impact of 
immigrants on the number of terror incidences is consistent with our hypothesis of an integration 
effect on the propensity to support terror and our previous findings from our individual-level 
analyses.   
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 Inclusion of country fixed effects substantially mitigates biases through endogeneity and omitted variables. See also 
the discussion in Dreher and Fischer (2010) and Fischer (2010).  
36
 Thus, the group of ‘immigrants’ includes also naturalized immigrants, who have obtained the legal right to vote and 
run for office. However, due to language restrictions integration of passport-holding immigrants into the economic, 
social and political dimension may still not be comparable to that of natives. 
37
 Due to data availability restrictions an analogous analysis for foreign-passport-holders in place of immigrants was 
not deemed to produce robust results.  
 35 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 13 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
7.2. The clash-of-cultures and terror: a country panel analysis 
As second step we differentiate now the stock of immigrants of Table 13 by their cultural 
background, measured by certain characteristics of their country of origin. Since OECD host 
countries are attractive to immigrants because of their wealth, their political stability and high 
standard of living, many immigrants originate from poorer or politically unstable countries around 
the world. These include immigrants from former colonies (India, Pakistan, South America), 
countries with a recent episodes of civil war and violent conflict (e.g. Ex-Yugoslavian countries), 
or poorer and overpopulated countries bordering the EU (e.g. Northern Africa). In the WVS wave 
3 data but also according to actual immigration data, half of the immigrant stock originates from 
OECD countries (USA, Canada and Europe) (see also below). For our country-level analysis, we 
employ the International Migration Database, obtained from OECD statistics, which contains 
information on the country of origin for stocks of immigrant persons (in thousands), for each 
OECD host country and year between 1991 and 2007.38 In analogy to the micro analysis of section 
5, we account for cultural background by, first, geographic region of origin, assuming that 
neighboring countries share certain values, traditions, history and institutions. Second, we also 
group the sending countries by the majority religion. In particular, we distinguish between the 
geographic regions Africa, Asia, Europe, Northern America, and Oceania, which includes not only 
Australia and New Zealand but also the regions Micronesia and Polynesia. Latin America and the 
Caribbean constitute one joint geographic region.39 By using geographic definitions we avoid 
including only countries along lines of majority religion or geo-political features. As regards 
                                                 
38
 Spain is excluded as extreme outlier from the regression samples of Tables 13 and 14. Unfortunately, these data 
contain many missing country-year observations, particularly for the period 1990-1996, but are, currently, the best 
available. Missing information on immigrants have been filled with the number of foreign-passport holders, where 
possible. This procedure is in analogy to the UN version of the International Migration Database, which pools both 
types of migrants.  
39
 In some analyses we split Africa further into the geographic regions Northern Africa and remaining Africa, and the 
region Asia into Western Asia and remaining countries in Asia. Note that the geographically defined regions are not 
identical to the region definitions used by international organizations.  By using this geographic definition we avoid 
including only countries along lines of majority religion or geo-political features. 
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religious denomination, we group countries by the majority religions (population share > 50%) 
Buddhism, Catholicism, Christian-Orthodox, Hinduism (two countries), Islam, Judaism (one 
country), Protestantism, and ‘other’; in the actual empirical analysis, Hinduism and Judaism are 
counted among the group of ‘other’. For each group of immigrants we calculate their share in the 
resident population. In our unbalanced panel of 24 OECD countries from 1991 to 2004 we observe 
that transnational terror events vary between 0 and 31 attacks, with a mean of 2 events and a 
standard deviation of 4. The largest sample mean of immigrant shares in the resident population 
are observed for those originating from Europe (5.6%), followed by those from Asian countries 
(1.8%). In terms of religion, most immigrants are either Protestants or Catholics (1.8% and 1.9%, 
respectively), closely followed by Muslims (1.5%).40 The relatively large share of Muslims and 
still considerable shares of immigrants from African countries (0.5%) as well as from Western 
Asia (0.7%) and remaining Asia (1.5%) makes us confident in being able to identify separate 
effects of majority religion and region of origin, particularly for Muslim immigrants from Africa 
and Asia. Table A7 of the Appendix provides further descriptive statistics.   
 
Table 14 estimates regressions on transnational terror attacks from 1991 to 2004, dividing 
immigrants into groups by regional origin (models 1 and 2) and religious background (model 3). 
Models 4 and 5 present the findings from a general-to-specific-analysis which pools the religious 
and regional origin measures into one model; thus models 4 and 5 test whether the dominating 
influence of ‘culture’ on transnational terror is exerted by geographic region of origin or majority 
religion in the country of origin. As in Tables 10 through 13, all models control for the commonly 
employed determinants of transnational terror in OECD countries, unobserved country 
heterogeneity, and a common non-linear time trend.  
 
Model 1 employs very broad definitions of geographic regions, approximating continental plates. 
These are Africa, Asia, Europe, Northern America, Oceania, and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The population share of immigrants from Africa is positively associated with transnational terror 
attacks, while those from Oceania and the Caribbean-South-American region show a negative 
relation. Immigrants from other parts of the world do not appear to play any decisive role for 
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 The mean share of immigrants with ‘no religion’ , ‘any other religion’, ‘Hindu’ or ‘Jew’ amounts to 2.5%. Due to 
the heterogeneity of this group, estimates have to be interpreted with caution.   
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terror. As argued before, the empirical set-up allows us to interpret these findings as causal, albeit 
with caution: in this light, immigrants from Africa appear to trigger more transnational terror 
incidences, while immigrants from Oceania and the Caribbean appear to reduce them.    
 
That immigrants from specific non-democratic countries, with possibly a history of violent 
conflict, and from religious states have a higher likelihood of supporting terrorism against 
Western-culture countries, compared to immigrants originating from other parts of the world, is a 
major public concern in OECD countries.41 Most of these ‘suspicious’ countries are located in 
Northern Africa and West Asia. Model 2 tests this conjecture by splitting the group of African and 
Asian immigrants into those from Northern African countries and those from remaining African 
countries, and those originating from Western Asia and the rest of Asia. The geographic group of 
Northern African countries includes Morocco, Djibouti, Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, 
Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Sudan, Chad, and Tunisia. The geographic group of Western Asian 
countries is formed by Georgia, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The results of model 2 are only partly 
consistent with this conjecture: While the terror-increasing effect in model 1 is triggered by those 
from Northern African countries (at the 1 percent level of significance), a terror-rising impact of 
immigrants from Asia is observed for those who come from all Asian countries except for Western 
Asia - a geographic region ‘Asia’ that excludes the Arabic peninsula.42   
 
Model 3 tests the influence of culture defined by majority religion in the sending country; the 
majority religion is thought to shape the values and traditions in a country. Excluding any 
geographic origin variable, immigrants from a Muslim country show a positive relation with the 
occurrence of transnational terror – with a statistically strong effect (at the 1 percent level). Terror-
lowering effects are observed for immigrants who come from predominantly Catholic countries, 
and for those from countries with one of the minor world religions (Hinduism, Judaism, and other 
religions); please note that by construction many OECD countries are part of this particular group. 
                                                 
41
 Dreher and Gassebner (2010) report that persons emigrating from countries with a higher number of terror 
incidences ‘cause’ transnational terror in the receiving countries.   
42
 The ‘remaining Asia’ effect is consistent with Huntington’s conflict intensity predictions between ‚Sinic’ and 
‚West’, while the insignificant effect for ‘Western Asia’ (the first subsample of his ‚Islam’ category) contradicts his 
conjectures. On the other hand, the strong effect on ‘Northern Africa’ (the second subsample of his ‚Islam’ category) 
is, again, supportive of his idea. 
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Immigrants from countries which are shaped by Christian-Orthodoxism, Buddhism, or 
Protestantism do not exert any influence on the number of transnational terror incidences in OECD 
countries.   
 
In order to test whether immigrants’ culture by either region or religion dominates for explaining 
transnational terror, model 4 pools the (almost) significant determinants of both models 1 and 2 
into one combined model.43 Because of the low number of host countries in the cross-section it 
was advisable to select the variables for the final combined model based on a general-to-specific 
(GTS) selection procedure: Starting from the most complete specification, variables with lowest z-
statistics were eliminated from the model in a step-by-step procedure. In addition, we used the 
Akaike-information criterion to observe the improvements in explanatory quality; the GTS was 
completed when the Akaike-value could not be improved on further. The estimates of the final 
specification are reported in column 4 of Table 14, with column 5 splitting the ‘Origin: Asia’-
group again into ‘Western Asia’ and ‘Remaining Asia’.44  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
For the question whether Muslim immigrants or immigrants from Northern Africa and Asia in 
general bring about transnational terror in OECD host countries, models 4 and 5 show clearly the 
dominance of geographic-origin over the religion-origin: the coefficient on ‘Origin: Islam’ is 
insignificant, while the geographic origins ‘Northern Africa’, ‘Remaining Africa’ and ‘Remaining 
Asia’ matter. Contrasting expectations, people from ‘Western Asia’ show, again, no influence on 
terror. As one may expect, the correlation between population shares ‘coming from an Islamic 
country’ and originating from certain world regions is considerably strong for Western Asia (0.75) 
and Northern Africa (0.67) – both correlations not too strong to impede a separate identification of 
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 Given the rather low number of host countries and years in this panel and considerable correlation between some 
measures of religion and regional origin (e.g. Buddhism and Asia, Protestantism and Oceania), a joint inclusion of all 
cultural variables made the model incalculable.  
44
 Estimates from a specific-to-general selection procedure are presented in Table A8 of the Appendix. The 
specification of the final model, however, is strongly path-dependent, and thus to some degree arbitrary.  
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region and religion effects.45 Wald-Tests of both religious and geographic factor estimates in 
models 4 and 5 show that ‘Origin: Islam’ does not matter even if jointly taken into account with 
those geographic regions for which these high correlations exist. In specific, there is no joint 
significance for ‘Islam’ with ‘Western Asia’ or ‘remaining Asia’.46 In model 4, the Wald-test 
shows no joint significance for the geographic factor ‘remaining Africa’ with ‘Origin: Islam’. 
Similarly, for the pair ‘Northern Africa’ and ‘Islam’ we observe that ‘Islam’ does contribute to its 
joint significance, albeit not enough to raise its statistical significance above the 5% threshold 
already observed for the geographic origin factor in isolation.47 Expressed more simply, having a 
Muslim religion plays some role for immigrants from Northern African countries, as it adds to the 
geographic origin effect, but not decisively; statistically spoken, the contribution of ‘being from a 
Muslim country’ to the effect of ‘coming from Northern Africa’ is negligible. Overall, these tests 
of joint significance in models 4 and 5 show that it is not the immigrants’ religion ‘Islam’, but their 
home culture defined by geographic proximity that matters for transnational terror.  
 
For all other groups of immigrants by regional or religious origin, we find either that they exert a 
terror-lowering impact or that they do not matter to the occurrence of transnational terror: As 
expected, immigrants originating from Europe, USA or Canada do not appear to influence the 
occurrence of transnational terror attacks. In contrast, immigrants from the region ‘Oceania’ show 
a terror-decreasing impact. These findings were already obtained in models 1 and 2, but now these 
relations hold when the cultural dimension ‘religion’ is accounted for in models 4 and 5. The 
public security-increasing effects of religions ‘Catholicism’ and ‘Other religion’ in model 3 are 
now equally preserved when we account for culture defined by geography.48 Overall, the only case 
where we observe a ‘switch’ from a previous religion effect in model 3 to a geographic effect in 
the complete models 4 and 5 is for the population share of immigrants coming from a country 
where the majority religion is Islam.  
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 Correlation coefficients are rather small for the regions of origin remaining Africa (0.31) remaining Asia (0.18), and 
Europe (0.26). 
46
 In model 5, the statistics of the Wald-tests of joint significances are as follows: Chi2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Western 
Asia, Origin: Remaining Asia)  =  3.99, p-value = 0.2629, (Origin: Islam, Origin: Remaining Asia)  =  3.99, p-value = 
0.1363, (Origin: Islam, Origin: Western Asia)  =  2.96, p-value = 0.2274.  
47
 In model 4, the statistics of the Wald-tests of joint significances are as follows: Chi2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Northern 
Africa, Origin: Remaining Africa) = 8.58, p-value = 0.0354, Chi2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Northern Africa) = 8.17, p-
value = 0.0168, Chi2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Remaining Africa) = 4.17, p-value = 0.1241.  
48
 The GTS revealed that the strongly significant negative effect of ‚Caribbean and South America’ in models 1 and 2 
was driven by the cultural dimension ‘Catholicism’. 
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In sum, the country panel analyses of the impact of immigration on transnational terror in OECD 
countries are in large consistent with our previous cross-sectional individual-level results: 
Immigrants do exert a terror-increasing effect. This impact on terror incidences appears driven by 
immigrants from Africa, particularly Northern Africa, and Asia - but not Western Asia – again, the 
country-level findings match that of the individual-level analysis perfectly. Both approaches find 
then that the geographic-origin effects dominate the ‘Islam’-effect: it is not the religion which 
drives these results. This finding contradicts the Huntington-hypothesis that it is the missionary 
and universalistic religious values of ‘Islam’ that impede a successful integration into a Western 
host country. Rather, our findings suggest that there are general cultural traits that relate to these 
geographic regions that are causal for why immigrants from those regions may support terror, 
triggering terror attacks. We discuss such possible explanation further in the conclusion.49    
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper tests whether immigrants are more likely than natives to be supporters of terrorist 
groups and, through lowering terrorists’ costs, increase the number of terror incidences in their 
host country. Using the World Values Survey on 55’000 persons in more than 45 countries (1994-
1999) we find that individual’s social, economic, and political disintegration increases the 
propensity to support terror. In particular, for OECD host countries we find that immigrants do 
show a higher propensity to accept using violence for political goal than natives. Differentiating by 
region of origin, we find strong evidence that persons who emigrated from Africa, Asia and 
Oceania into culturally distant OECD countries are more prone to accept violence. Interestingly, 
these effects are orthogonal to individual religion – being a Muslim plays no role for explaining 
this individual support for terror. We also present some evidence that integration in labor markets 
and a longer residence may reduce the clash-of-cultures-effect on terror support.  
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 Since the panel data include also several years after the 9/11-attacks, we can be assured that we have found a general 
relation between integration and terror acceptance. 
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In a second part of the paper we employ country panels of transnational terror attacks in 30 OECD 
countries (1991-2004), and show not only that population’s support for terror is positively 
associated with terror, but also that the share of immigrant population increases the occurrence of 
terror attacks. Consistent with the micro-level analysis, immigrants particularly from Asia (but not 
Western Asia) and Africa appear to trigger terror events, while immigrants from Oceania do not 
exert such effect. Corroborating our survey-based findings, originating from a Muslim culture does 
not appear to matter.   
 
These results are largely consistent with economic and sociological theories of the supply of crime, 
terror and violence. Immigrants face lower political, economic and social opportunity costs of 
supporting terrorism, and, in case of a great cultural distance to their host countries, even lower 
psychological costs of doing so. The empirical results also support the view that geographic origin 
and religion constitute two distinct dimensions of ‘culture’; given the public discussions about ‘a 
threat by Islamism’, our study rather shows that many problems with integrating immigrants are 
rooted in cultural-geographic distance rather than denominational differences. These micro- and 
macro-level findings contradict the traditional Huntington-Hypothesis (1996) that rests on the 
universalist and missionary values of the religion ‘Islam’; rather, they are both in support of a 
broader interpretation of his conjecture which we discuss below. However, we cannot exclude 
alternative explanations to a simple ‘clash-of-cultures’-conjecture. Nannestad (2004) has shown 
that non-Western immigrants50 are less integrated in the Danish labor market than immigrants from 
Western cultures – thus, labor market discrimination (in host countries) may well increase in the 
culture gap between immigrants and natives, because of incomparability of signaling languages 
and work attitudes; a large culture gap may also be an obstacle to immigrants’ successful political 
and social participation. As a consequence, the opportunity costs of crime may be lower for 
immigrants from culturally-distanced countries than that for those from culturally close regions. 
Another alternative explanation for our finding is that the act of migration itself (and the 
experiences made therein) changes people’s preferences, depending on their region of origin. 
Often, immigrants from countries in civil war or ruled by unstable regimes undergo periods of 
social and emotional suffering and economic hardship before they finally arrive in their final 
destination; psychologically spoken, such experiences could change immigrants’ discount factor, 
                                                 
50
 In his study, the Non-Western countries include Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, Lebanon (Palestine), and Somalia. 
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making them less ‘patient’ and willing to await the return on their investment in the far-away 
future. Overall, our findings may not support the existence of a ‘clash-of-cultures’ as such, but 
simply suggest that immigrants develop, depending on their regions of origin, differing degrees of 
frustration and discontent that are finally expressed through acts of violence (e.g. Li 2005). 
 
Our analysis leaves the question open what ‘geographic origin’ as cultural factor does reflect - 
values of ‘machismo’ developed over long centuries, possibly a recent history of civil war and 
fights for independence, or the current experience of non-functioning political institutions ? – all 
these experiences and traditions ‘clash’ with Western values and help shaping preferences and 
attitudes that are incompatible with ‘Western’ societies. In African and Asian countries, terrorism 
and violent conflict may possibly be commonly accepted means by which ‘politics’ is done – an 
attitude which is then quasi ‘imported’ into OECD countries by immigrants from those regions. In 
support of such region-specific cultural traits, a recent survey by Baier et al. (2009) on violence 
propensity among pupils in Germany has revealed that children whose parents originate 
particularly from (pooled) Northern Africa and Arabic peninsula, Albania/Yugoslavia, and Turkey 
accept social norms that justify violence by males against other persons under certain 
circumstances (defense of honor, protection of family members, violence against wife, etc.) 
(p.72).51 Possibly, it is such attitudes on ‘manliness’ and implicitly ‘acceptable ways of problem-
solving’ that are deeply rooted in certain world regions which may constitute the underlying real 
cause for why certain groups of immigrants show such high propensity to support terror.  
 
Certain shortcomings due to data restrictions do not yet allow to draw final policy 
recommendations for the fight against terror and integration policies: On the one hand, our cross-
sectional analysis suggests that civic engagement eases the integration of immigrants in general 
into their host society– we remain, however, ignorant which factors help narrowing this cultural 
gap between immigrants from Asia and Africa and natives. Even though we have some indication 
that employment and a long duration of residence may aid, more in-depth research with national 
household panels constructing channels of causality is needed to analyze the differing mechanisms 
of integration by immigrants’ cultural origins. Further research should also analyze to what extent 
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 Among the male pupils from these three regions, 24.9%, 21.8%, and 23.5%, respectively, agreed to such social norm 
of manliness. In contrast, only 4,9% of the native German pupils accepted such norm.  
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second-generation immigrants, who have been born in their host countries, are similar to their 
parents in their propensity to support terror. Finally, there is a strong need to investigate into the 
determinants of geographically-bound attitudes – are these shaped by recent experiences of 
conflict or do they constitute long-lasting cultural values? Without such in-depth knowledge, no 
policy advice on how to integrate people from such regions can be given. 
 
Overall, while this study is possibly one of the first empirical contributions to reveal the terror-
increasing impact of immigration from cultural-geographically distanced regions, it constitutes 
only a very first small step of empirical research that still awaits further investigation. In particular, 
we need more in-depth analyses on mediating factors of the differing ‘geographic-region-of-
origin’-effects, the economic, social and political causes for why geographic origin of immigrants 
matters, and the reasons for the irrelevance of religion. Moreover, we are in need of more 
information on the dynamics of a successful integration before we can derive any policy 
conclusion. The public debate remains open.  
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Appendix  
 
 
Table A1: Countries  
code Freq. Percent code Freq. Percent 
   
 
 
 
ALB 770 1.30 MDA 892 1.50 
ARG 1’055 1.77 MEX 2’159 3.63 
ARM 1’872 3.15 MKD 911 1.53 
AUS 1’958 3.29 NGA 1’744 2.93 
AZE 1’925 3.24 NOR 1’116 1.88 
BGD 1’152 1.94 NZL 998 1.68 
BGR 931 1.57 PER 1’112 1.87 
BIH 1’094 1.84 PHL 1’195 2.01 
BLR 1’876 3.16 PRI 1’094 1.84 
BRA 1’142 1.92 ROU 1’104 1.86 
CHE 1’103 1.86 RUS 1’787 3.01 
CHL 957 1.61 SCG 1’401 2.36 
COL 2’96 4.98 SLV 1’144 1.92 
CZE 1’036 1.74 SVK 981 1.65 
DEU 1’932 3.25 SVN 937 1.58 
DOM 358 0.60 SWE 979 1.65 
ESP 1’17 1.97 TUR 1’537 2.59 
EST 950 1.60 TWN 744 1.25 
FIN 915 1.54 UKR 2’132 3.59 
HUN 601 1.01 URY 957 1.61 
IND 1’547 2.60 USA 1’434 2.41 
LTU 860 1.45 VEN 1’138 1.91 
LVA 1’103 1.86 ZAF 2’677 4.50 
   
 
 
 
Total 59’440 100    
Notes: Based on regression sample of model 1 of Table 2. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics (wave 3) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Using violence for political goals not justified      
Strongly agree (1) 59440 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Agree (2) 59440 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Disagree (3) 59440 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Strongly disagree (4) 59440 0.08 0.28 0 1 
When came to country      
Within past 2 years 52951 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Within past 3-5 years   52951 0.00 0.06 0 1 
6-10 years ago 52951 0.01 0.09 0 1 
11-15 years ago  52951 0.01 0.12 0 1 
More than 15 years ago 52951 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Native  52951 0.94 0.24 0 1 
Birth country      
Born in this country 53189 0.94 0.25 0 1 
Origin: Latin America  53189 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Origin: USA/Canada 53189 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Origin: Asia  53189 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Origin: Europe  53189 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Origin: Africa  53189 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Origin: Other  53189 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Origin: Oceania 53189 0.00 0.03 0 1 
OECD (country of current residence) 59440 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Religion      
Protestant 47266 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Catholic 47266 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Christian-Orthodox 47266 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Jewish 47266 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Muslim 47266 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Hindu  47266 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Buddhist 47266 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Other  47266 0.03 0.18 0 1 
      
Active membership 59390 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Friends important 59070 0.85 0.35 0 1 
Number of active memberships 59390 0.75 1.21 0 9 
Number (squared) 59390 2.02 5.51 0 81 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics (wave 3) (cont.) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Geographical groups belonging to first      
Local identity 59440 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Regional identity 59440 0.14 0.34 0 1 
National identity 59440 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Continental identity 59440 0.03 0.18 0 1 
World identity 59440 0.09 0.29 0 1 
No geographic identity 59440 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Socio-demographic controls      
Age 59440 40.86 15.76 15 94 
Age^2/100 59440 19.18 14.47 2.25 88.36 
Age^3/10000 59440 10.08 11.17 0.34 83.06 
Male 59440 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Children, 0-8 59440 1.86 1.68 0 8 
Children^2 59440 6.28 10.28 0 64 
Conservative-extreme 59440 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Conservative-moderate 59440 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Center 59440 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Leftist-moderate 59440 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Leftist-extreme 59440 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Ideology missing 59440 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Full time employed 59440 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Part time 59440 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Self-employed 59440 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Retired 59440 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Housewife 59440 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Student 59440 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Unemployed 59440 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Other 59440 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Married 59440 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Living together as married 59440 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Divorced 59440 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Separated 59440 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Widowed 59440 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Single/never married 59440 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Incomplete elementary education 59440 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Completed elementary education 59440 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Incomplete secondary school: technical 59440 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Complete secondary school: technical 59440 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Incomplete secondary: university-prep. 59440 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Complete secondary: university-prep. 59440 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Some university without degree 59440 0.07 0.26 0 1 
University degree 59440 0.17 0.37 0 1 
      
Notes: Descriptive statistics based on empirical model 1 of Table 2. 
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Table A3: Baseline model without integration measures 
Variable coeff. Variable coeff. Variable coeff. 
      
Age -0.012 
Full time  
employed ref. cat. Widowed 0.028 
 [1.67]    [1.53] 
Age^2/100 0.021 Part time 0.03 Single/never married 0.001 
 [1.45]  [1.14]  [0.03] 
Age^3/10000 -0.014 Self-employed 0.004 
Incomplete  
elementary education ref. cat. 
 [1.42]  [0.13]   
Male 0.073*** Retired 0.024 
Completed  
elementary education -0.003 
 [7.10]  [1.21]  [0.11] 
Children, 0-8 -0.007 Housewife 0.090*** 
Incomplete secondary  
school: technical -0.018 
 [0.69]  [3.83]  [0.67] 
Children^2 0.001 Student 0.013 
Complete secondary  
school: technical -0.059* 
 [0.69]  [0.50]  [1.85] 
Conservative-extreme 0.074*** Unemployed 0.070*** 
Incomplete secondary:  
university-prep. -0.039 
 [3.57]  [3.40]  [1.28] 
Conservative-moderate -0.012 Other 0.042 
Complete secondary:  
university-prep. -0.069** 
 [0.64]  [1.34]  [2.07] 
Center ref. cat. Married ref. cat. 
Some university  
without degree -0.096*** 
     [2.95] 
Leftist-moderate -0.013 
Living together  
as married 0.007 University degree -0.116*** 
 [0.81]  [0.28]  [3.01] 
Leftist-extreme 0.095*** Divorced 0.015 Constant 1.598*** 
 [3.29]  [0.93]  [13.54] 
Ideology missing -0.045** Separated 0.064** Country FE yes 
 [2.43]  [2.10]   
    Observations 59440 
    Adjusted R2 0.08 
Notes: Dependent variable: “using violence to pursue political goals is never justified”. Answers range from “agree” 
(1) to “do not agree at all” (4). All models include country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. ‘*’, ‘**”, ‘***” denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics of the WVS (wave 1) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Behavior: Having committed violence  
against persons as political action 14330 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Attitude: Terrorism is justified 11491 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Protestant 14330 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Jew 14330 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Muslim 14330 0.00 0.04 0 1 
other 14330 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Catholic 14330 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age 14330 42.07 17.99 16 100 
Age^2/100 14330 20.94 16.84 2.56 100 
Age^3/10000 14330 11.79 13.33 0.41 100 
Male 14330 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Conservative-extreme 14330 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Conservative-moderate 14330 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Leftist-moderate 14330 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Leftist-extreme 14330 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Ideology missing 14330 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Full time employed 14330 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Part time 14330 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Self-employed 14330 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Retired 14330 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Housewife 14330 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Student 14330 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Unemployed 14330 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Married 14330 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Living together as married 14330 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Divorced 14330 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Separated 14330 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Widowed 14330 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Single/never married 14330 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Education (years) 14330 17.09 2.98 12 21 
Notes: Sample is based on model 4 of Table 9. 
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics for transnational terror 1995-2000 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Transnational terror events  41 4.90 20.64 0 126 
Transnational terror events, 95-00 41 0.01 0.01 0 0.06 
Transnational terror rate, 95-00 41 1.12 2.14 0 11.67 
      
Violence justified, (%pop). 41 21.16 10.88 1.25 56.51 
Violence justified, squared 41 563.18 615.58 1.55 3193.84 
GDP per capita (log) 41 7.79 1.23 5.71 10.38 
GDP per capita (log), 90-95 41 7.82 1.24 5.76 10.43 
Population (log) 41 16.41 1.50 14.16 20.65 
Population, (log), 90-95 41 16.41 1.51 14.15 20.70 
Voting in line with USA 41 0.43 0.10 0.16 0.59 
Voting in line with USA, 90-95 41 0.40 0.10 0.19 0.53 
Economic growth 41 3.53 4.73 -10.00 15.60 
Economic growth, 90-95 41 3.97 4.53 -3.57 29.14 
Political rights 41 -2.82 1.45 -6.50 -1 
Political rights, 90-95 41 -2.78 1.35 -6 -1 
Political rights, change 41 0.05 0.29 -1 1 
      
Year  countries year countries year countries 
1995 7 1997 5 1999 1 
1996 20 1998 8 Total 41 
      
 Countries included 
 ALB BRA HRV NOR TUR 
 ARG CHL HUN NZL UKR 
 ARM COL IND PER URY 
 AUS CZE LTU PHL VEN 
 AZE DOM LVA RUS ZAF 
 BGD ESP MDA SLV  
 BGR EST MEX SVK  
 BIH FIN MKD SVN  
 BLR GEO NGA SWE  
Notes: Based on regression sample of model 1 of Table 11.  
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Table A6: Descriptive statistics: Transnational terror attacks and migration 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Full sample 
Transnational terror events 189 .98 1.93 0 13 
Immigrants, %pop, (t-1) 189 11.03 7.51 1.9 33.8 
Log of immigrants, (t-1) 189 2.17 .70 .64 3.52 
GDP per capita (log), (t-1) 189 10.10 .32 8.78 11.03 
Log of population, (t-1) 189 16.33 1.32 12.94 19.49 
Economic growth, (t-1) 189 3.11 2.10 -1.99 11.10 
Political rights, (t-1) 189 -1.12 .318 -4.5 -1 
Government fractionalization, (t-1) 189 .34 .27 0 .83 
Trend 189 8.04 2.85 1 12 
Year 189 2000.04 2.85 1993 2004 
 Sample without Spain 
Transnational terror events 182 .88 1.85 0 13 
Immigrants, %pop, (t-1) 182 11.24 7.56 1.9 33.8 
Log of immigrants, (t-1) 182 2.19 .70 .64 3.52 
GDP per capita (log), (t-1) 182 10.11 .32 8.78 11.03 
Log of population, (t-1) 182 16.28 1.33 12.94 19.48 
Economic growth, (t-1) 182 3.09 2.13 -1.99 11.10 
Political rights, (t-1) 182 -1.11 .32 -4.5 -1 
Government fractionalization, (t-1) 182 .35 .27 0 .83 
Trend 182 8 2.87 1 12 
Year 182 2000 2.87 1993 2004 
      
 Countries in full sample 
 AUS AUT BEL CAN AUS 
 CHE CZE DEU DNK CHE 
 ESP FIN FRA GBR ESP 
 GRC HUN IRL ITA GRC 
 LUX NLD NOR NZL LUX 
 POL PRT SVK SWE POL 
 TUR USA    
      
Notes: Samples are based on regression samples of models 4 (full sample) and 1 (subsample) of Table 13. 
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Table A7: Descriptive statistics: Transnational Terror attacks and immigrants’ origin 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Transnational terror events 2.01 4.12 0 31 
Origin: Africa, %pop, (t-1) .47 .44 .001 1.88 
Origin: Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1) .24 .29 0 1.2 
Origin: Africa but Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1) .23 .22 0 .99 
Origin: Asia, %pop, (t-1) 1.76 1.65 .01 7.19 
Origin: Western Asia, %pop, (t-1) .69 .72 0 2.77 
Origin: Asia but Western Asia, %pop (t-1) 1.47 1.63 .01 6.88 
Origin: Europa, %pop, (t-1) 5.56 4.86 .05 29.15 
Origin: Northern America, %pop, (t-1) .22 .14 .02 .63 
Origin: Oceania, %pop (t-1) .35 .83 .001 4.42 
Origin: Caribbean and  
South American region, %pop, (t-1) .66 1.35 .0008 6.11 
Origin: Christian-Orthodoxism, %pop, (t-1) .60 .62 .002 3.14 
Origin: Protestantism, %pop, (t-1) 1.89 2.45 .04 8.74 
Origin: Catholicism, %pop, (t-1) 1.82 2.46 .05 19.01 
Origin: Buddhism, %pop, (t-1) .60 .76 .003 3.26 
Origin: Islam, %pop, (t-1) 1.55 1.13 .003 5.32 
Origin: Other religion (incl. Hinduism and Judaism),  
%pop, (t-1) 2.55 2.03 .02 15.56 
GDP per capita (log), (t-1) 10.13 .25 8.78 10.95 
Population, (log), (t-1) 16.78 1.29 12.99 19.49 
Economic growth, (t-1) 2.58 1.71 -1.99 7.36 
Political rights, (t-1) -1.18 .42 -4.5 -1 
Government fractionalization, (t-1) .28 .26 0 .75 
Trend 9.22 3.56 1 14 
     
 Included countries 
 AUS CHE DEU DNK 
 FIN GBR GRC IRL 
 ITA LUX MEX NLD 
 NOR NZL POL SWE 
 TUR USA   
     
Notes: Sample for transitional terror attacks based on regression 1 of Table 14 (117  country-year observations). 
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Table A8: Specific to General: Transnational Terror attacks and immigrants’ origin 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Origin: Asia, %pop, (t-1) 2.993*** 2.931*** 2.935*** 2.883*** 3.534** 
 [2.85] [2.65] [2.66] [2.64] [1.99] 
Origin : Northern America, %pop, (t-1) 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 
 [1.93] [1.87] [1.91] [1.84] [1.78] 
Origin: Oceania, %pop, (t-1) -11.433*** -11.157*** -12.842*** -11.151*** -10.070** 
 [3.71] [3.89] [3.36] [3.22] [2.26] 
Origin: Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1) 2.299* 1.667 1.886 2.031 2.419** 
 [1.79] [1.08] [1.10] [1.49] [1.97] 
Origin: Africa but Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1) 2.324** 2.604 2.426** 2.099** 1.994** 
 [2.47] [1.47] [2.24] [2.15] [2.06] 
Origin: Other religions (Hindus and Jews),  -2.438*** -2.093*** -2.235*** -2.125*** -2.307*** 
%pop, (t-1) [3.87] [5.66] [5.55] [4.38] [2.69] 
Origin: Islam, %pop, (t-1) 0.264 0.524* 0.330 0.499 0.380* 
 [1.15] [1.72] [1.19] [1.61] [1.69] 
Origin: Catholicism, %pop, (t-1) -2.843*** -3.289** -2.630*** -2.823*** -2.925*** 
 [3.27] [2.28] [2.66] [3.28] [3.47] 
Origin: Europe, %pop, (t-1) 0.197     
 [0.77]     
Origin. Caribbean and South-American 
region, %pop, (t-1)  0.791    
  [0.46]    
Origin : Christian-Orthodoxism, %pop, (t-1)   0.509   
   [0.93]   
Origin. Protestantism, %pop, (t-1)    0.088  
    [0.25]  
Origin : Buddhism, %pop, (t-1)     -1.463 
     [0.39] 
      
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 
Akaike information criterion 3.267 3.268 3.266 3.268 3.267 
Akaike*n 382.288 382.317 382.168 382.398 382.297 
Notes: Models results from a step-by-step specific-to-general selection of the cultural variables based on the Akaike 
information criterion. Dependent variable is the number of transnational terror attacks in a country, 1992 – 2004, in 18 
OECD countries. All models employ a negative binomial estimator and include country fixed effects. Observations are 
clustered at the country level. All models control, for commonly used macroeconomic and political factors of 
transnational terror. The starting model also included the share of Muslim immigrants in the population, and the 
population shares of those originating from Northern Africa and from Central and Southern Africa.   
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1a: The propensity to use violence of natives and immigrants (world sample) 
Using violence  
for political goals  
not justified immigrant % native % total % 
       
Strongly agree 1’857 50.89 28’115 51.30 29’972 51.28 
Agree 1’085 29.73 15’652 28.56 16’737 28.63 
Disagree 446 12.22 6’425 11.72 6’871 11.75 
Strongly disagree 261 7.15 4’612 8.42 4’873 8.34 
       
Total 3’649 100.00 54’804 100.00 58’453 100.00 
 
 
 
Table 1b: The propensity to use violence of natives and immigrants (OECD sample) 
Using violence  
for political goals  
not justified immigrant % native % total % 
       
Strongly agree 742 58.33 10’798 59.22 11’603 51.28 
Agree 301 23.66 4’633 25.41 4’992 28.63 
Disagree 136 10.69 1’512 8.29 1’661 11.75 
Strongly disagree 93 7.31 1’290 7.08 1’393 7.09 
       
Total 1’272 100.00 18’233 100.00 19’649 100.00 
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Table 2: Integration and acceptance of violence for political purposes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 World World World World OECD OECD OECD OECD 
Conservative-extreme 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.049 0.048 0.051 0.046 
 [3.57] [3.65] [3.58] [3.56] [1.45] [1.47] [1.50] [1.34] 
Conservative-moderate -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.051 -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 
 [0.64] [0.60] [0.63] [0.58] [1.33] [1.27] [1.27] [1.26] 
Center ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. Ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. 
         
Leftist-moderate -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.084*** 
 [0.81] [0.84] [0.79] [0.78] [3.09] [3.07] [3.08] [3.06] 
Leftist-extreme 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.06 0.058 0.059 0.062 
 [3.29] [3.27] [3.28] [3.26] [1.43] [1.44] [1.44] [1.47] 
Ideology missing -0.045** -0.047** -0.044** -0.047** -0.066** -0.070** -0.066** -0.067** 
 [2.43] [2.61] [2.40] [2.65] [2.44] [2.57] [2.43] [2.37] 
Full time employed ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. Ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. ref.cat. 
         
Part time 0.03 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.03 
  [1.14] [1.09] [1.10] [1.11] [1.36] [1.37] [1.28] [1.22] 
Self-employed 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.103** 0.101** 0.104** 0.102** 
  [0.13] [0.10] [0.13] [0.13] [2.69] [2.74] [2.67] [2.61] 
Retired 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.041* 0.042* 0.039 0.041 
  [1.21] [1.18] [1.25] [1.21] [1.78] [1.81] [1.67] [1.74] 
Housewife 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.101** 0.102** 0.099** 0.100** 
  [3.83] [3.82] [3.85] [3.91] [2.60] [2.65] [2.59] [2.52] 
Student 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.04 0.044 0.039 0.04 
  [0.50] [0.53] [0.47] [0.53] [0.67] [0.70] [0.64] [0.68] 
Unemployed 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.084** 0.082** 0.082** 0.084** 
  [3.40] [3.33] [3.45] [3.37] [2.84] [2.84] [2.85] [2.89] 
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Table 2: Integration and acceptance of violence for political purposes (cont.) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
World World World World OECD OECD OECD OECD 
Other 0.042 0.04 0.043 0.046 0.049 0.044 0.047 0.05 
  [1.34] [1.30] [1.35] [1.47] [1.00] [0.88] [0.95] [1.01] 
World identity  ref.cat.    ref.cat.   
         
Local identity  0.019    0.049   
  [0.74]    [1.36]   
Regional identity  -0.026    -0.029   
  [0.91]    [0.94]   
National identity  -0.038**    -0.025   
  [2.02]    [1.02]   
Continental identity  -0.039    -0.029   
  [1.38]    [0.75]   
No geographic identity  0.109**    0.168*   
  [2.06]    [2.09]   
Active membership   0.006    -0.029**  
   [0.38]    [2.37]  
Friends important    -0.033*    -0.044 
    [1.82]    [1.17] 
country FE yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
other micro controls yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 59440 59440 59390 59070 17919 17919 17871 17822 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
number of countries 46 46 46 46 14 14 14 14 
Notes: Dependent variable: “using violence to pursue political goals is never justified”. Answers range from “agree” (1) to “do not agree at all” (4). All models 
includes control variables for age, gender, marital status, children, education, occupational status, self-positioning on political left-right scale, and country fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ‘*’, ‘**”, ‘***” denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance. 
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Table 3: Integration of immigrants and acceptance of violence as political means: 
world sample 
Model 1: Immigrants Model 4 Political ideology Model 5: Employment 
      
Born in this country -0.020 Born in this country -0.010 
Born in this 
country -0.025 
 [0.68]  [0.28]  [0.72] 
Observations 53200 
Conservative-
extreme 0.028 Part time -0.009 
Adjusted R2 0.07  [0.39]  [0.16] 
  
Conservative-
moderate 0.022 Self-employed 0.094 
 
 
 [0.45]  [1.29] 
 
 Leftist-moderate -0.006 Retired 0.029 
Model 2: Duration of residence     
 
 Leftist-extreme 0.171*** Housewife -0.064 
Within past 2 years 
ref. 
cat..  [3.19]  [1.19] 
  Ideology missing -0.044 Student 0.064 
Within past 3-5 years 0.009  [1.08]  [1.05] 
 [0.10] Ideology * born 0.047 Unemployed 0.044 
6-10 years ago -0.03  [0.67]  [0.79] 
 [0.33] Ideology * born -0.043 Other 0.017 
11-15 years ago 0.021  [0.83]  [0.15] 
 [0.21] Ideology * born -0.011 Part time * born 0.026 
More than 15 years ago 0.001  [0.23]  [0.47] 
 [0.02] Ideology * born -0.092 
Self-employed * 
born -0.096 
Born in this country -0.026  [1.59]  [1.45] 
 [0.29] Ideology * born -0.001 Retired * born -0.016 
Observations 52951  [0.02]  [0.39] 
Adjusted R2 0.07 Observations 53200 
Housewife * 
born 0.154*** 
 
 Adjusted R2 0.07  [2.73] 
Model 3 : private networks    Student * born -0.06 
     [0.89] 
Born in this country -0.008   
Unemployed * 
born 0.016 
 [0.14]    [0.29] 
Friends important -0.018   Other * born 0.016 
 [0.34]    [0.13] 
Friends imp.* born -0.013     
 [0.26]   Observations 53200 
Observations 52866   Adjusted R2 0.07 
Adjusted R2 0.07     
    
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: “using violence to pursue political goals is never justified”. Answers range from “agree” 
(1) to “do not agree at all” (4). All models includes control variables for age, gender, marital status, children, 
education, occupational status, self-positioning on political left-right scale, and country fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the country level. ‘*’, ‘**”, ‘***” denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance. 
 59 
Table 4: Integration of immigrants and acceptance of violence as political means: 
OECD countries 
Model 1: Immigrants Model 4: Political ideology Model 5: Employment 
      
Born in this country -0.079** Born in this country -0.054   
 [2.56]  [1.23] 
Born in this 
country -0.108** 
Observations 17800 
Conservative-
extreme 0.045  [2.58] 
Adjusted R2 0.04  [0.54] Part time 0.025 
  
Conservative-
moderate 0.025  [0.34] 
Model 2: Duration of residence  [0.33] Self-employed 0.197 
 
 Leftist-moderate -0.052  [1.19] 
Within past 2 years ref. cat.  [0.54] Retired 0.033 
  Leftist-extreme 0.147  [0.54] 
Within past 3-5 years 0.044  [1.23] Housewife -0.163* 
 [0.34] Ideology missing -0.067  [1.89] 
6-10 years ago -0.011  [0.77] Student -0.018 
 [0.07] Ideology * born 0.007  [0.21] 
11-15 years ago -0.059  [0.10] Unemployed 0.035 
 [0.34] Ideology * born -0.081  [0.27] 
More than 15 years ago -0.048  [1.02] Other 0.085 
 [0.32] Ideology * born -0.034  [0.37] 
Born in this country -0.119  [0.40] Part time * born 0.002 
 [0.83] Ideology * born -0.091  [0.02] 
Observations 17725  [0.86] 
Self-employed * 
born -0.100 
Adjusted R2 0.04 Ideology * born 0.002  [0.70] 
 
 
 [0.03] Retired * born 0.009 
 
 Observations 17800  [0.13] 
Model 3: Social networks Adjusted R2 0.04 
Housewife * 
born 0.278** 
     [3.00] 
Born in this country -0.075   Student * born 0.057 
 [0.64]    [0.70] 
Friends important -0.042   
Unemployed * 
born 0.054 
 [0.38]    [0.38] 
Friends imp.* born 0.003   Other * born -0.044 
 [0.03]    [0.19] 
Observations 17703     
Adjusted R2 0.04   Observations 17800 
    Adjusted R2 0.04 
    
 
 
Notes: See Table 2 
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Table 5: Social networks and support for using violence for political goals 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 World World World World World 
Born in this country -0.017   -0.005 -0.021 
 [0.50]   [0.14] [0.60] 
Active membership 0.024     
 [0.70]     
Born*active mem. -0.012     
 [0.33]     
Number of active 
membership 
 0.004 -0.006 0.030** -0.051 
  [0.59] [0.43] [2.35] [1.55] 
Number of active 
memberships, squared 
  0.002  0.021*** 
   [1.08]  [2.91] 
Born * act. num.    -0.025* 0.051 
    [1.89] [1.55] 
Born * act. num., squared     -0.020** 
     [2.67] 
      
Observations 53151 59390 59390 53151 53151 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
no of countries 42 46 46 42 42 
      
 6 7 8 9 10 
 OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD 
Born in this country -0.067   -0.038 -0.067 
 [1.41]   [0.93] [1.46] 
Active membership -0.007     
 [0.18]     
Born*active -0.022     
 [0.52]     
Number of active 
memberships  -0.01 -0.029*** 0.024* -0.064* 
  [1.76] [3.19] [1.91] [1.95] 
Number of active 
memberships, squared   0.005**  0.021*** 
   [2.43]  [3.19] 
Born * number    -0.036*** 0.038 
    [3.12] [1.02] 
Born * number, squared     -0.017** 
     [2.45] 
      
Observations 17753 17871 17871 17753 17753 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
no of countries 14 14 14 14 14 
Notes: See Table 2. ‘Active membership’ is a dichotomous measure of social capital through civic engagement in 
clubs and organizations, while ‘Number of active memberships’ is the number of active memberships in such 
organizations.  
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Table 6: Integration of immigrants: geographic identity and geographic origin 
 World OECD  World OECD 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Born 0.015 -0.084 Born in this country  ref. cat. ref. cat. 
 [0.25] [1.01]    
      
Geographic identity   Region of Origin   
Local 0.046 0.032 Origin: Latin America -0.100 -0.250*** 
 [0.86] [0.51]  [1.59] [5.66] 
Local * born -0.037 0.023 Origin: USA/Canada -0.140** -0.085 
 [0.67] [0.42]  [2.35] [0.80] 
Regional 0.08 0.159 Origin: Asia 0.103* 0.238*** 
 [1.15] [1.37]  [1.70] [5.35] 
Regional * born -0.112 -0.191 Origin: Europe -0.004 0.034 
 [1.64] [1.46]  [0.15] [0.78] 
National -0.027 -0.049 Origin: Africa 0.169 0.343*** 
 [0.40] [0.51]  [1.67] [3.10] 
National * born -0.019 0.031 Origin: Other  0.015 0.128*** 
 [0.29] [0.30]  [0.15] [3.36] 
Continent 0.044 0.003 Origin: Oceania 0.251 0.664*** 
 [0.48] [0.02]  [0.85] [11.04] 
Continent * born -0.095 -0.035    
 [1.09] [0.26]    
No geog. identity -0.006 -0.117    
 [0.05] [0.59]    
No ident. * born 0.132 0.350*    
 [1.06] [1.77]    
      
      
Other micro controls yes yes Other micro controls yes yes 
Country FE yes yes Country FE yes yes 
Observations 53200 17800 observations 53189 17790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.05 Adjusted R2 0.07 0.05 
number of countries 42 14  42 14 
Notes: See Table 2.  
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Table 7: The role of religion 
 1 2  3 
 World OECD  OECD 
   
 
 
Protestant Ref.cat. Ref.cat. Protestant Ref.cat. 
     
Catholic 0.023 0.020 Catholic 0.014 
 [1.32] [0.83]  [0.61] 
Christian-Orthodox 0.026 0.006 
Christian-
Orthodox -0.013 
 [0.49] [0.06]  [0.12] 
Jewish 0.013 0.007 Jewish -0.020 
 [0.18] [0.13]  [0.36] 
Muslim 0.022 0.205** Muslim 0.073 
 [0.53] [2.22]  [0.90] 
Hindu 0.025 0.360* Hindu 0.056 
 [0.76] [1.92]  [0.26] 
Buddhist 0.062 0.050 Buddhist -0.120 
 [0.96] [0.59]  [1.31] 
Other 0.072*** 0.122*** Other 0.116*** 
 [3.04] [5.27]  [4.53] 
   
 
 
   Region of Origin  
   native Ref.cat. 
     
   Latin America -0.192** 
    [2.55] 
   USA/Canada -0.029 
    [0.21] 
   Asia 0.394*** 
    [6.02] 
   Europe 0.057 
    [1.12] 
   Africa 0.369* 
    [2.13] 
   Other 0.112*** 
    [3.25] 
   Oceania 0.749*** 
    [7.75] 
     
Other micro controls yes yes  yes 
Country FE yes yes  yes 
Observations 47266 13791  13720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.05  0.05 
Notes: See Table 2.  
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Table 8: Does integration prevent the clash-of cultures in OECD countries? 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Origin: Latin America -0.165 -0.145** -0.05 -0.497*** 
 [1.20] [2.51] [0.44] [5.99] 
Origin: USA/Canada -0.448*** -0.305*** -0.098 -0.099 
 [5.06] [3.82] [0.40] [0.66] 
Origin: Asia  0.182 0.361*** 0.469*** 0.272*** 
 [1.55] [4.20] [3.52] [4.69] 
Origin: Europe  0.008 0.04 -0.002 0.042 
 [0.18] [0.68] [0.03] [0.79] 
Origin: Africa  0.169 0.583*** 0.740** 0.481*** 
 [0.74] [3.84] [2.50] [3.53] 
Origin: Other 0.105** 0.067 0.093 0.034 
 [2.49] [0.70] [0.79] [0.71] 
Origin: Oceania  1.195*** 0.24 -0.184 0.286** 
 [73.40] [1.70] [1.60] [2.23] 
Integration measures 
Full-time or part-time employed -0.071***    
 [3.34]    
At least 15 years in host country  1.049***   
  [3.42]   
At least 6 years in host country   -0.459  
   [1.54]  
Number of active engagements    -0.012** 
in social and political groups    [2.24] 
     
Region of origin * integration measure 
Latin Am. * integration -0.165 -1.346*** 0.144 0.209*** 
 [0.95] [3.97] [0.39] [6.14] 
USA/Canada * integration 0.672*** -0.444 0.479 0.011 
 [4.42] [1.55] [0.93] [0.23] 
Asia * integration 0.093 -1.467*** 0.089 -0.032 
 [0.65] [3.93] [0.38] [0.83] 
Europe * integration 0.052 -1.057*** 0.503* -0.006 
 [0.70] [3.39] [1.77] [0.18] 
Africa * integration 0.394 -1.666*** 0 -0.137 
 [0.81] [4.03] [.] [1.64] 
Other * integration 0.041 -0.959** 0.502 0.063*** 
 [0.44] [2.93] [1.49] [3.16] 
Oceania * integration -0.936** 0 1.595*** 0.210** 
 [2.88] [.] [5.27] [2.92] 
     
Other micro controls yes yes yes yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 17790 17790 17790 17743 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Notes: See Table 2.  
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Table 9: Comparability of ‘support of terrorism’ with ‘support for violence for political 
goals’ 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
wave 3: using violence for political goals not 
justified (1)/justified (4) 
wave 1: terrorism justified (1)/  
must be condemned (-1) 
      
Protestant Ref.cat. Ref.cat. Ref.cat. Ref.cat. Ref.cat. 
      
Catholic 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.007 0.007 
 [0.89] [0.91] [0.96] [0.28] [0.27] 
Christian-orthodox 0.002 0.002 - - - 
 [0.01] [0.02]    
Jewish 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011 
 [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.07] [0.07] 
Muslim 0.212** 0.212** 0.226** 0.514*** 0.515*** 
 [2.50] [2.51] [2.71] [3.47] [3.48] 
Buddhist 0.364* - - 0.399*** - 
 [1.94]   [3.17]  
Hindu 0.051 0.051 0.049 0.216* 0.216* 
 [0.59] [0.59] [0.57] [1.81] [1.82] 
Other 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** -0.052 -0.052 
 [5.34] [5.36] [5.37] [1.61] [1.61] 
      
Micro controls yes yes yes yes Yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 14038 14018 13928 12911 12897 
Notes: In models 1 through 3, dependent variable: “using violence to pursue political goals is never justified”. 
Answers range from “agree” (1)  to “do not agree at all” (4). In models 4 and 5, dependent variable: “(A) There may 
be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified. (B) Terrorism for whatever motive must always be 
condemned”. Answers include “agree with B” (-1) “, “agree to neither (0)”, and “agree with A (1)”. For both 
dependent variables, higher values indicate a greater support for terror. All models include as additional controls age, 
gender, occupational status, marital status, education, and political ideology. Education in models 4 and 5 is 
measured in year of schooling, while models 1 through 3 use a categorical measure based on the ISCED scale. All 
models include country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ‘*’, ‘**”, ‘***” denote 10, 
5 and 1 percent level of significance. 
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Table 10: Support for terror and committing violent acts against persons 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Attitude: 
“Terrorism is 
justified”  0.009*** 0.015***  0.006*** 0.008*** 
  [5.71] [7.08]  [4.88] [5.86] 
Jew 0.015   0.005   
 [1.16]   [0.55]   
Muslim 0.058** 0.051**  0.058*** 0.041**  
 [2.30] [1.97]  [2.69] [2.14]  
Other 0.003 0.003  0.002 0.001  
 [0.55] [0.49]  [0.40] [0.19]  
Catholic 0.000 -0.001  0.000 -0.001  
 [0.16] [0.38]  [0.07] [1.14]  
Male 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 [3.11] [2.98] [2.97] [3.85] [4.07] [2.78] 
       
Selected 
controls       
Conservative-
extreme    0.007*** 0.003 0.004 
    [2.68] [1.24] [1.24] 
Leftist-extreme    0.047*** 0.042*** 0.049*** 
    [3.96] [3.61] [4.85] 
Unemployed    0.010*** 0.007*** 0.006** 
    [4.90] [2.99] [2.44] 
Single    0.003*** 0.003** 0.002 
    [2.86] [2.08] [1.21] 
       
Other micro 
controls    yes yes yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 15255 12213 13669 14330 11463 13450 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of having a past of committing violence against persons. 
Models 4 to 6 include as socio-demographic controls gender, age, political ideology, marital status, occupational 
status, and education. They also include country fixed effects. Probit estimations with standard errors adjusted to 
clustering at the country level. Reported are marginal effect for a 1 percent change in the explanatory variable 
(dummy: change from 0 to 1) evaluated at the sample mean.  
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Table 11: Support for violence and transnational terror attacks 1995-2000 
 1 2 3 
Estimation method Neg. bin. OLS OLS 
Dependent variable count Average count Average rate 
    
Violence justified (%pop) 0.242** 0.224** 0.001** 
 [2.29] [2.45] [2.13] 
Violence justified, squared -0.005** -0.004** -0.000** 
 [2.39] [2.30] [2.32] 
GDP p.c. (log) -0.212   
 [0.48]   
Population (log) 0.596*   
 [1.87]   
Voting in UN in line w. USA -2.571   
 [0.55]   
Economic growth 0.12   
 [1.51]   
Political rights -0.071   
 [0.20]   
Political rights, change -3.925** -3.200** -0.016** 
 [2.42] [2.23] [2.14] 
GDP p.c. (log)  0.108 -0.002 
1995-2000  [0.26] [0.93] 
Population (log)  0.632** -0.001 
1995-2000  [2.21] [0.54] 
Voting in UN in line w. USA  1.889 0.024 
1995-2000  [0.41] [1.01] 
Economic growth  0.044 0.002*** 
1995-2000  [0.63] [4.45] 
Political rights  -0.485 -0.002 
1995-2000  [1.34] [1.27] 
    
Observations 41 41 41 
Adjusted R-squared  0.23 0.47 
Pseudo R-squared 0.36   
Notes: Dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is the counted terror events in a country in the year of attitude-
measurement, in models 2 and 5 the number of terror events in a country averaged over 1995 to 2000, and in models 
3 and 6 the average count of terror events per 10’000’000 residents. All models control for economic growth, 
political rights, change in political rights, GDP, population, and voting in the UN in line with USA. 
Contemporaneous control measures are used in models 1 nd 4, and averages (1995-2000) in the remaining models. 
Models 1 and 4 employ the negative binomial estimator, while the remaining models are estimated with OLS.  
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Table 12: Support for terror and transnational terror attacks 1980-1985 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Estimation 
method Neg. bin. OLS OLS Neg. bin. OLS OLS 
Dependent 
variable count 
average 
count 
average 
rate count 
average 
count 
average 
rate 
Terrorism 
justified, %pop  1.129*** 5.679** 0.011    
 [3.63] [2.75] [0.74]    
Terrorism 
justified, squared -0.026*** -0.126** 0.000    
 [3.47] [2.58] [0.73]    
Terrorism justified 
(log)    3.001*** 24.154*** 0.041 
    [3.89] [3.92] [0.75] 
Population (log) 0.636***   0.635***   
 [5.34]   [5.39]   
GDP p.c. (log) 0.006   0.138   
 [0.01]   [0.19]   
Political rights -1.224*   -0.961   
 [1.94]   [1.47]   
Population (log)  2.925*** -0.007  3.015*** -0.007 
1980-1985  [4.03] [1.33]  [5.15] [1.30] 
GDP p.c. (log)  6.867 0.007  7.079 0.007 
1980-1985  [1.42] [0.19]  [1.85] [0.20] 
Political rights  -28.528*** -0.049  -25.730*** -0.043 
1980-1985  [4.58] [1.08]  [5.05] [0.94] 
       
Observations 12 12 12 11 11 11 
Adjusted R2  0.85 -0.24  0.9 -0.15 
Pseudo R2 0.2674   0.3087   
Notes: Dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is the counted transnational terror events in a country in the year of 
attitude-measurement, in models 2 and 5 the number of terror events in a country averaged over 1995 to 2000, 
and in models 3 and 6 the average count of terror events per 10’000’000 residents. All models control for 
economic growth, political rights, GDP, population. Contemporaneous control measures are used in models 1 
and 4, and averages (1995-2000) in the remaining models. Models 1 and 4 employ the negative binomial 
estimator, while the remaining models are estimated with OLS. Models 4, 5 and 6 exclude the Netherlands (with 
29% finding terrorism as justified) as outlier.  
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Table 13: Immigration into OECD countries and transnational terror incidents 1993-2004 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Spain excluded full sample 
Immigrants (non-natives),  0.470 0.971*  0.245 0.343**  
%pop, (t-1) [1.22] [1.75]  [1.56] [2.54]  
Immigrants squared, (t-1)  -0.022*   -0.008  
  [1.65]   [0.95]  
Log of immigrants, (t-1)   4.948*   1.278* 
   [1.84]   [1.80] 
       
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time trend (non-linear) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Countries 25 25 25 26 26 26 
Observations 182 182 182 189 189 189 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events, in 25 and 26 OECD 
countries, respectively, all from 1993 to 2004. Countries included are reported in Appendix Table 
A6. Models 1 through 3 exclude Spain which was identified as a statistical outlier, while models 3 to 
6 report the estimates for the full sample. All models control for economic growth, political rights, 
GDP, population, a time trend, and country fixed effects. All models employ the negative binomial 
panel estimator with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level. 
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Table 14: Immigration into OECD countries, culture and terror incidents 1991 - 2004 
 1 2 3 4 5 
   
 
  
Origin: Africa , %pop,  (t-1) 1.137*    2.201** 
 [1.65]    [2.45] 
Origin: Northern Africa, %pop,  (t-1)  2.607***  1.917**  
  [2.76]  [2.00]  
Origin: Africa but Northern Africa,   -0.452  2.108*  
%pop,  (t-1)  [0.30]  [1.77]  
Origin: Asia, %pop,  (t-1) 1.251   3.846**  
 [1.41]   [2.16]  
Origin: Western Asia, %pop,  (t-1)  0.465   1.969 
  [0.38]   [0.82] 
Origin: Remaining Asia, %pop,  (t-1)  2.319**   5.715* 
  [1.99]   [1.80] 
Origin: Europe, %pop,  (t-1) -0.139 -0.257  0.119 0.499 
 [0.69] [1.45]  [0.35] [1.23] 
Origin: Northern America, %pop,  (t-1) 1.582 2.533  3.908 3.704 
 [0.33] [0.41]  [0.79] [0.72] 
Origin: Oceania, %pop,  (t-1) -11.621*** -15.191***  -10.650** -17.413*** 
 [3.05] [3.04]  [2.47] [3.90] 
Origin: Caribbean and -1.874** -3.097**    
South American region, %pop,  (t-1) [2.44] [2.44]    
   
 
  
Origin: Christian-Orthodoxism,    -0.927   
%pop,  (t-1)   [1.27]   
Origin: Other rel. (incl. Hinduism and 
Judaism),  %pop, (t-1)   -1.530* -2.762*** -2.831* 
   [1.69] [2.64] [1.65] 
Origin: Catholicism, %pop,  (t-1)   -2.211** -2.858*** -2.549*** 
   [2.17] [3.57] [3.02] 
Origin: Islam, %pop,  (t-1)   1.037*** 0.182 -1.086 
   [2.89] [0.66] [1.41] 
Origin: Protestantism, %pop, (t-1)   0.914   
   [1.22]   
Origin: Buddhism, %pop, (t-1)   2.442 -2.518 -4.291 
   [1.48] [1.00] [1.03] 
Time trend (non-linear) yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 
Akaike information criterion 3.320 3.325 3.324 3.327 3.332 
Akaike*n 388.486 388.982 388.945 389.253 389.823 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events, in 18 OECD countries, from 1991 to 2004. All 
models control for economic growth, political rights, GDP, population, a non-linear time trend, and country fixed 
effects (see also Table 13). All models employ the negative binomial panel estimator with observations clustered at the 
country level.  Models 4 and 5 are robust to the inclusion of share of Protestant immigrants; in model 5;  the effect of 
‘Origin:Africa’ becomes then more pronounced.   
